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MACHINE INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL REASONING
JC SMITH*
INTRODUCTION
Has any one seen HAL, the computer in the Arthur C. Clarke
and Stanley Kubrick film, 2001: A Space Odyssey, "that could think,
talk, see, feel, and occasionally go berserk"? HAL was supposed to
have come into consciousness and be operational on January 12,
1997.1 While Clarke and Kubrick, "failed to predict the biggest ad-
vance of the past 20 years: miniaturization and microelectronics, '2
nevertheless we do not even have computers which can manage natu-
ral language at the level of a two year old infant. Is Clarke and
Kubrick's, (and many others') vision of a HAL-like intelligent com-
puter an impossible dream, or was merely their "technological time
line... woefully inaccurate"? 3 At the present time we simply do not
know for certain. Nevertheless, I will give reasons why, for the fore-
seeable future at least, the traditional artificial intelligence ("Al")
paradigm is not only misconceived, but results in a misdirection of
effort and scarce resources. An alternative, albeit more modest para-
digm will be offered, which leads research and development in a dif-
ferent and more fruitful direction. These issues, as will be shown, are
of fundamental importance to the field of artificial intelligence and
law.
The area of artificial intelligence and law has a special interest for
both computer scientists and the legal profession. Most legal informa-
tion, at the present time, is originally created in electronic form, thus
providing large quantities of data for experimentation. Many com-
puter scientists in the field of artificial intelligence, therefore, are
drawn to the discourse of the law as a fertile field for research, more
so than other types of text, because of the increasing reliance of the
legal profession on information in electronic form, the fact that the
content has structure, and the tantalizing notion that law is based on a
* JC Smith is a Professor Emeritus of Law and founder and Director of the University of
British Columbia Faculty of Law Artificial Research ("FLAIR") Project. The author would like
to thank Professor Richard W. Wright of the Faculty of the Chicago-Kent College of Law and
Murray Braithwaite for their helpful comments and suggestions on this article.
1. See Simson Garfinkel, Happy Birthday HAL, WIRED, Jan. 1997, at 120.
2. Id. at 124.
3. Id. at 121.
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logical foundation. From the perspective of the lawyer, we have the
concept of the rule of law, as contrasted with the rule of persons; thus,
in some sense separating the legal conceptual process from the
human. It is this contrast that seduces us into envisaging judges as
reasoning machines and computers as judges. Professor Anthony
D'Amato wrote an article with a title in the form of the question, Can/
Should Computers Replace Judges?4 In the course of this article
D'Amato provides "A Modest Proposal for Dehumanized Decision-
making." 5 He concludes his article with the statement that "[b]y re-
moving a large area of unpredictable 'judgment' from the law, society
may benefit from a sharply reduced number of litigated cases,"
thereby resulting in fewer judges, fewer attorneys, and fewer cases. 6
He calls this vision, "a determinable legal system."'7
The very title of such an article entails certain presuppositions
about the nature of legal discourse and reasoning, and about the na-
ture of what we call artificial intelligence. Such a title presupposes
that legal discourse is fairly lucid and stable, and that legal reasoning
is rule governed. The very question that constitutes D'Amato's title
must implicitly entail these two assumptions for the question to make
any sense, as a high degree of lucidity, clarity, and rule governedness
would be essential in order that a computer could render an accepta-
ble judgment on a legal issue. The question further assumes that the
term artificial intelligence is more than a mere metaphor, in that it is,
at least in part, real or genuine intelligence, except that it is artificial in
the sense that it is not human.
There are, however, a prior set of questions about the nature and
structure of human intelligence, legal discourse, legal reasoning, and
machine intelligence which ought to be considered before we even ask
questions such as whether computers can, and if so, ought to function
as judges. The answer to these prior questions ought to determine the
kind of research and development we undertake in the field of com-
puters and law because the objectives we choose and the methods we
use will be different according to the positions we take on these pre-
liminary issues.
The question, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges? is based on
two common delusions. These two delusions, together, result in a mis-
understanding of the nature and structure of intelligence. The first of
4. Anthony D'Amato, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges, 11 GA. L. REv. 1277 (1977).
5. Id. at 1288.
6. Id. at 1300-01.
7. Id. at 1301.
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these has been called "Descartes' Error." 8 Descartes' error was in
concluding that intelligence can exist independently of the human
body. Another name for Descartes' error is mind/body dualism. The
second delusion I will designate as "Leibnitz's Fallacy." Leibnitz's fal-
lacy was in believing that all human thought could be expressed
through a universal language which could function with mathematical
precision, and that social problems could consequently be solved
through computational means. Leibnitz's motto for resolving disputes
and difficult issues was, "Calculemus!," "Let us calculate." 9 He said
that, "[t]hings are like numbers,"'10 and he once wrote a thesis entitled
New Method of Teaching and Learning Jurisprudence," so he most
certainly, had he been asked, would have responded to D'Amato's
question with an enthusiastic, "Yes!"
According to the Church-Turing thesis, machine intelligence and
human intelligence are essentially equivalent. 12 While human inteffi-
gence is far more complex than machine intelligence, there neverthe-
less is no qualitative difference between the two. If the Church-Turing
thesis is valid, then the human brain can be usefully viewed as a neural
computer and human languages can be viewed as corresponding to
software, and the computer can be viewed as a mechanical brain.
13
The Church-Turing thesis leads to a reverberating set of metaphors.
Human intelligence becomes a metaphor for the computer, and the
computer becomes a metaphor for the human. The conception of the
human as an organic machine, and the computer as a mechanical en-
tity, has not only profoundly affected the field of artificial intelligence,
but it has shaped our own view of ourselves. 14 The use of computer
discourse to describe human mental processes is a common and wide-
spread phenomenon. People now speak of programming and
reprogramming themselves. It is not uncommon to hear forms of
mental illness referred to as hardware and software problems. Others
speak of memory lapses as problems of information retrieval. 15
In 1965, Herb Simon predicted that by 1985, (12 years earlier
than the predicted birth of HAL), "machines will be capable . .. of
8. ANTONIO R. DAMAsIo, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN
BRAIN 247-48 (1994).
9. Z.A. MELZAK, BYPASSES: A SIMPLE APPROACH TO COMPLEXITY 228 (1983).
10. 4 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 422 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
11. Id. at 423.
12. See RAYMOND KURZWELL, THE AGE OF INTELLIGENT MACHINES 117, 152 (1990).
13. See WARREN S. MCCULLOCH, EMBODIMENTS OF MIND (1965).
14. See SHERRY TURKLE, THE SECOND SELF: COMPUTERS AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT (1984).
15. See id. at 285.
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doing any work that a man can do."' 16 Predictions such as this are
implicitly based on the validity of the Church-Turing thesis. If, how-
ever, that thesis is invalid, then it is highly unlikely that machines will
ever "be capable of doing any work that a man can do." These predic-
tions have failed to materialize. This failure may, on the one hand, be
due to the fact that Thring, Simon, and others were overly optimistic
as to the time frame, or, on the other hand, the failure may be due to
the possible invalidity of the Church-Turing thesis. If these predic-
tions were to come true in some distant future, then it would be very
likely that at least some legal disputes could be adjudicated by ma-
chines. In order to address Professor D'Amato's question, however,
we must examine the Church-Turing thesis more closely, from the per-
spective of Descartes's Error and Leibnitz's Fallacy.
II. DESCARTES'S ERROR
It is one of the supreme ironies of human understanding that very
often the things we take most for granted are the most difficult to
explain or define. 17 This is certainly true of the idea of intelligence.
We have no theory of the mind or psyche, and therefore, even though
we can recognize it, we cannot explain intelligence. It is not the case
that we have a number of theories which are, as yet, not proven, and
we merely have to wait until more evidence comes in to resolve the
theoretical issues which remain in dispute. Rather, we simply have no
true theories at all. All that we have are models, and models are not
theories. A true theory must explain the nature and origin of a phe-
nomena. A model has little or no explanatory power.
A. The Ingredients of Intelligence
Human intelligence has four necessary conditions: (1) conscious-
ness, (2) the self, (3) perception, and (4) language.18 Human intelli-
gence entails consciousness. Cognition takes place within
16. HERBERT SIMON, THE SHAPE OF AUTOMATION FOR MEN AND MANAGEMENT 96
(1965).
17. Martin Heidegger spent an academic life time exploring such ordinary everyday con-
cepts such as being, time, and thinking. See, e.g., MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (John
Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., 1962); MARTIN HEIDEGGER, WHAT IS CALLED THINK-
ING (Fred D. Wieck & J. Glenn Gray trans., 1968).
18. T.J.M. Bench-Capon defends the traditional view of Al, but states that "[in discussing
the notion of intelligence as applied to computer systems, however, we should be aware that
what counts as an intelligent computer system is not the same as what would count as intelligent
for a human being." T.J.M. BENCH-CAPON, KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION: AN APPROACH TO
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 3 (1990). Thus the defenders of the Church-Turing thesis and the
traditional view of Al want to have it both ways.
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consciousness. There is no outside of consciousness from which we
can view it. Therefore, "[s]cience's biggest mystery is the nature of
consciousness.' 19 We have developed no theory of consciousness be-
cause it is consciousness that is doing the theorizing. Consciousness is
self-reflective. It is the perception of perception, and the awareness of
awareness.
Human intelligence assumes the existence of a self. Yet where
and what is the self? The sentence, "I should learn to spend more
time with myself," makes perfect sense, yet who is the I, and whose is
the self? Who is doing the thinking, and what is the object of the
thought? This paradox demonstrates that language presupposes the
subject. "I am thinking about myself." "I am now thinking about my-
self, thinking about myself." The self as subject always recedes
outside of language as the thinker or the speaker. This is the reason
we say such things as "my body" even though there can be no self
without the body, and there can be no body without the self.
20
Our perceptual world consists of vision, sound, taste, heat, cold,
pain, pleasure, touch,ldand smell. We have no explanation for even the
simplest of sensory experiences. We know red when we see it. We
understand the physics of light. We understand how the eye works as
a biological sensory system. We do not, however, have any explana-
tion whatsoever for how the processes going on in the retina, the optic
nerve, and the brain produce within an individual the experience of
redness. Biology and physics alone cannot explain the phenomena of
seeing red.
Language and consciousness presuppose each other in that each
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the other. The struc-
ture of language entails a syntactical distinction between subject and
object and a related conceptual distinction between self and other,
which presupposes consciousness. It is impossible to conceive of an
animal that had language and yet did not have consciousness. Ani-
mals with complex communication systems, such as those possessed
by ants, bees, whales, or dolphins do not have language. Animal com-
munication is not structured like a language, but rather like a code.
Language consists of very much more than merely the transfer of in-
formation. The fundamental difference between plant and animal life
is that plants have no internal representation of an outside environ-
19. NICK HERBERT, QUANTUM REALITY: BEYOND THE NEW PHYSICS 249 (1985).
20. See Richard Warner, Is the Body a Physical Object?, in NATURALISM, A CRITICAL AP-
PRAISAL 255 (Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner eds., 1993).
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ment. Animals, unlike plants, have an inner perceptual representa-
tion of not only the external world, but the external and internal parts
of their own bodies. Animals, therefore function with an instinctive
perceptual system that spans the external and the internal, converging
at points that mark the inside from the outside. This perceptual repre-
sentational system, which models both the animal's body and the ex-
ternal world, permits the organism to modify its behavior and to learn
to distinguish between the beneficial and the harmful. The human
brain, on the other hand, has evolved the capacity to create a system
of symbols to represent the perceptual system, which permits individ-
uals to formulate goals and plan actions to achieve them. Within the
human there is no clear boundary between the perceptual system and
the symbolic system. The perceptual and symbolic systems merge into
a conceptual-perceptual representation of the external world. As we
perceive, we filter our perceptions through language, and probably
our perceptions and language impose a form on the development of
the neural network of the brain, which in turn filters perception and
language.
Consciousness functions like a meta-representational system.
Thus we have the knower and the known, the self, and the other.
When the knower knows itself, the knower unavoidably objectifies it-
self. We say such things as "I have the right to do what I want with my
own body." Since one's own body is an object of observation, mind/
body dualism is implicit in consciousness. We thus speak of our
minds, our psyches, our souls, and our bodies. An adequate theory of
the mind would require an understanding of the relationship between
the psyche and the brain. We know that there is a relationship be-
tween the two, but we don't know what that relationship is. No one as
yet has transcended mind/body dualism, nor has bridged the phenom-
enological gap between the two. Even though consciousness is central
to intelligence, we must nevertheless keep in mind Freud's admonition
not to overvalue the property of being conscious. Much of the mental
processes which go on in the use of language take place at the uncon-
scious level. When we read the sign "USED FOOD EQUIPMENT
FOR SALE," it is completely open as to whether the word used is to
modify the word food, or the word equipment. Our mental process
almost instantaneously recognizes that we use the adjective used far
more often to modify the word equipment, than we ever use it to mod-
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ify the word food. We generally reach the appropriate interpretations
without consciously thinking about them.
21
When we view machines as thinking entities, we project our own
mind/body dualism onto them. When in a science fiction story or
movie such as 2001: A Space Odyssey, we project intelligence onto an
imaginary computer such as HAL, we implicitly endow it with some
perceptual mechanisms that would permit the machine to have a dy-
namic internal representation or model of the external world. The
machine would be able to differentiate what was internal to it from
what was external to it, and thus would evolve a conception of a self.
The machine would further have a symbolic representational system,
constituted in language, which would represent the perceptual system.
The machine could then be said to be conscious. Thus we project a
homunculus, or a little human psyche, inside a mechanical body.
B. Mind Without Body
Descartes's error is to conceive of the possibility that the mind is
independent of the human body.22 Implicit in the Church-Turing the-
sis is the assumption that intelligence can exist independent of the
human body. While it is true that machines can calculate, calculation
is only one of many particular functions of intelligence, and it is not
the same thing as intelligence. Intelligent entities can calculate, but it
does not follow from this that calculating entities are intelligent. The
essential characteristic of intelligent agents is the capacity to act in the
fullest sense of action. Human intelligence is manifested in the capac-
ity to have goals, plan and evaluate alternative strategies, and carry
them out.
Antonio R. Damasio, a professor of neurology, argues in his
book, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, that
emotions are a necessary condition of human action. 23 According to
Damasio, emotions and feelings are not "intruders in the bastion of
reason" but are "enmeshed in its networks, for worse and for bet-
ter."'24 He gives examples where the emotional part of a person's
brain has been damaged, but the reasoning part is left untouched.
These people are able to formulate and select the best plan of action,
but still, nevertheless, remain unable to act. Action requires emotion.
Damasio writes:
21. See STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT (1994).
22. See 1 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF DESCARTES 101 (1972).
23. See DAMASIO, supra note 8.
24. Id. at xii (emphasis in original).
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I believe that, relative to the brain, the body proper provides
more than mere support and modulation: it provides a basic topic
for brain representations.
In the perspective of the above hypothesis, loye and hate and
anguish, the qualities of kindness and cruelty, the planned solution
of a scientific problem or the creation of a new artifact are all based
on neural events within a brain, provided that brain has been and
now is interacting with its body. The soul breathes through the
body, and suffering, whether it starts in the skin or in a mental im-
age, happens in the flesh.
25
Freud, who wrote in the German language, used the German
word for soul which the English translators translated as psyche, a
Latin term, because the English word "soul" has religious connota-
tions, which the German word does not.26 Freud did not believe that
mind could exist independent of the living human body, nor, for that
matter, does Damasio.
Damasio goes on to say that:
My view then is that having a mind means that an organism
forms neural representations which can become images, be manipu-
lated in a process called thought, and eventually influence behavior
by helping predict the future, plan accordingly, and choose the next
action; Herein lies the center of neurobiology as I see it: the process
whereby neural representations, which consist of biological modifi-
cations created by learning in a neuron circuit, become images in
our minds; the process that allows for invisible microstructural
changes in neuron circuits (in cell bodies, dendrites and axons, and
synapses) to become a neural representation, which in turn becomes
an image we each experience as belonging to US.
2 7
If emotions are necessary for action, and the capacity to act is
necessary for intelligence, then we can safely assume that emotion is a
necessary aspect of human intelligence.
Descartes's error was in conceiving mental phenomena as in-
dependent of the human body. The traditional paradigms of artificial
intelligence commit the same error. Terry Winograd, one of the pio-
neers of the field of artificial intelligence chose for the title of an essay
the question, Thinking Machines: Can there be? Are we?28 The title
of D'Amato's article, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges?, while
25. Id at xvii.
26. See, e.g., BRUNO BETTELHEIM, FREUD AND MAN'S SOUL, at xi, 11-12 (1983).
27. DAMASIO, supra note 8, at 90.
28. Terry Winograd, Thinking Machines: Can there be? Are we?, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 167, 167 (Derek Partridge & Yorick Wilks eds., 1990) [hereinafter
FOUNDATIONS].
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somewhat more specific, raises the same issues. Winograd's conclu-
sion bears equally on D'Amato's question. Winograd concludes:
In the tradition of artificial intelligence, we project an image of
our language activity onto the symbolic manipulations of the
machine, then project that back onto the full human mind.
But these projections are like the geometric projection of a
three-dimensional world onto a two-dimensional plane. We system-
atically eliminate dimensions, thereby both simplifying and dis-
torting. The particular dimensions we eliminate or preserve in this
exercise are not idiosyncratic accidents. They reflect a philosophy
that precedes them and which they serve to amplify and extend....
[W]e all too easily dismiss the, concerns of human meaning that
make up the humanities, and indeed of any socially grounded un-
derstanding of human language and action .... [W]e lose sight of
the tacit embodied understanding that undergirds our intelligence.
29
A classic example of Descartes's error in the context of artificial
intelligence is the concept of intelligent "Software Agents." One web
site proclaims that "[s]oftware agents are on-line pseudo-people. '30 A
software agent is defined as a piece of software which acts to accom-
plish tasks on behalf of its user. Etzioni and Weld ascribe the follow-
ing set of properties to software agents. 31 Software agents would be
autonomous, goal-oriented, collaborative, flexible, self-starting, tem-
porally continuous, character-based (defined as "a well-defined, be-
lievable personality" 32 and emotional state), communicative, adaptive,
and mobile. If the agent is mobile then it is able to "transport itself
from one machine to another and across different system architectures
and platforms. '' 33 Thus, a software agent is just as independent of the
machine as Descartes's soul or mind is of the human body.
III. LEIBNITZ'S FALLACY
Leibnitz's dream of a universal, mathematical-like language that
would permit human thought to be ideally carried out as a process of
logical calculation has turned out to be highly flawed. Language is
much more complex than had previously been realized. G6del has
demonstrated that logical systems, in and of themselves, are either not
provable, or they are incomplete. 34 Heisenberg's uncertainly principle
29. Id. at 188-89.
30. Michael Coen, What's an Agent? (visited Feb. 24, 1998) <http://www.ai.mit.edu/people/
mhcoen/agents/section2_1_l.html>.
31. See Oren Etzioni & Daniel S. Weld, Intelligent Agents on the Internet: Fact, Fiction, and
Forecast, IEEE EXPERT, Aug. 1995, at 44-45.
32. Id. at 45.
33. Id.
34. See KURT GODEL, ON FORMALLY UNDECIDABLE PROPOSITIONS (1962).
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has revealed some of the limitations of mathematical models of the
physical universe. 35 Our most profound philosophers such as Nietz-
sche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein have clearly demonstrated that lan-
guage is far more complex than what was assumed to be the case by
the traditional rationalism and logical empiricism which, in the past,
has inspired the field of artificial intelligence.36 Leibnitz's view of lan-
guage is wrong on at least two counts. First, it assumes that precision
is better than imprecision, and secondly that the relationship between
words and what they signify is necessary or fixed. Both of these
presuppositions run counter to the nature and function of legal dis-
course. Many of the concepts of law such as "reasonable doubt,"
"malice," "proximate cause," "responsibility," etc., are functional pre-
cisely because of their imprecision. The issue of what is the most ap-
propriate legal doctrine to apply to a set of facts lies at the very heart
of "hard cases," and the very practice of using relevant precedents
assumes that the same legal doctrine can be applied to different fac-
tual situations. Legal reasoning thus exhibits a marked mobility in the
relationship between the words and concepts of legal discourse and
the material facts of life they can be used to signify.
A. The Value of Imprecision
In learning about human intelligence through the process of
simulating intelligence in the machine, we are haunted by an uncer-
tainty about our own thought processes. It would seem that we are
not clear about what kind of thinking is ideal and what kind is second
best. The issue may be reduced to the simple but difficult question as
to whether mathematical and logical reasoning is better than less for-
mal thought processes such as practical reasoning, and the somewhat
related question as to whether a deductive system of knowledge is in
some way superior to a body of knowledge that is neither systematic
or logical, but is practical and intuitive. Poets and novelists would
favor the latter, but scientists, mathematicians, and logicians would
likely prefer the former. As far as human thought is concerned, we
need not privilege one form over the other because humans can do
both and can appropriately choose which form is best for which pur-
poses. For machines, however, it is different. The capacity of the
machine to carry out mathematical and deductive computations is far
35. See LEE SMOLIN, THE LIFE OF THE COSMOS 245-47 (1997).
36. See JOSEPH WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER POWER AND HUMAN REASON 221 (1976).
[Vol. 73:277
MACHINE INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL REASONING
greater than that of humans, while, on the other hand, the facility of
the machine with natural language is very limited.
The way in which we comparatively evaluate mathematical-logi-
cal-deductive reasoning and less systematic and structured discourse
has critical implications for artificial intelligence. The most character-
istic aspect of machine intelligence is that it is computational, and be-
cause it is computational it is precise. Propositions are either true or
false and premises either follow deductively or they do not. Conse-
quently, precise forms of human thought such as logical deduction or
mathematical reasoning, where everything is reducible to two states
representable by a binary system, can be represented or simulated
very well within an intelligent machine system. By far the greatest
part of human intelligence is not computational, and consequently it is
not precise. Words and corresponding concepts such as high, low, hot,
warm, cold, far, very far, near, very near, etc., are all imprecise. One
can always substitute a precise mathematical measure in terms of kilo-
meters, meters, and centimeters, or in terms of the gradations of a
temperature scale on a thermometer. Such precision, however, has a
cost: the cost of measurement or of getting exact information.
Human intelligence is efficient because we consciously or uncon-
sciously reduce transaction costs by maximizing the degree of impreci-
sion with which we can function before the costs of imprecision
outweigh the savings gained by being inexact. We say that a person is
young, but we could equally say that the person is ten years, eight
months, three weeks, four days, and five and one-half hours old. Sel-
dom, however, do we need to go beyond the age in years. We almost
never act on the basis of complete information. We can state a gen-
eral rule of action that humans reduce the transaction cost of acting by
finding the appropriate degree of imprecision of information by mea-
suring the costs of acquiring the information against the costs of
imprecision.
There is an inverse relationship between information costs and
the costs of imprecision. The higher the degree of precision or accu-
racy in human action, the greater the information costs, and con-
versely, the higher degree of imprecision we can tolerate in our
actions, the greater the degree that we can reduce information costs.
At the same time, there are costs to imprecision. Human action gen-
erally takes place at the point of economic maximization as between
the costs of acquiring the information necessary for precision, and the
costs of acting with less than maximum information. We might repre-
1998]
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The relationship between the costs of imprecision of knowledge
and the costs of the acquisition of knowledge furnishes the primary
justification from an economic perspective for the existence of rules.
The optimum time for an eight-year-old child to go to bed will differ
from day to day depending upon a large number of variables such as
their activities of that day, what time they got up in the morning, and
the activities awaiting them the next day. It is costly for the parent to
argue and debate these various factors every evening to find the opti-
mum time. It is more economic to set a general time, for example, of
nine o'clock each night. Thus, rules save the cost of finding the opti-
mum action or point of action on each occasion by tolerating a degree
of imprecision. Rules should never be absolute, however, as there will
always be occasions when the costs of imprecision will be too high.
Thus, parents will waive the rule for a special television program or a
visit of a close relative such as a grandparent.
The discourse of the law is replete with imprecise concepts and
terms. Reasonable belief, proximate cause, the standard of care of the
reasonable person, good faith, malice, balancing of interests, etc., are
to name but a few. The law often deals with very fundamental issues
in extremely imprecise ways. Legal discourse is often so imprecise
[Vol. 73:277
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because the information costs to achieve a greater degree of precision
are generally too high. Take, for example, the issue of the criminal
responsibility of children. Some children have the mental capacity to
be responsible for their actions by the time they reach five, while
others achieve it at a much later age. The law, however, arbitrarily
sets the age of criminal responsibility at a fixed point such as the age
of seven. This saves the cost of an intensive testing program in each
individual case where a young child has committed a crime.
Some children reach a sufficient degree of maturity to properly
exercise a franchise in their early teens. Some adults, on the other
hand, fail to demonstrate sufficient maturity to be entitled to vote. To
save the extensive information costs for ascertaining the maturity of
each citizen, the law sets the arbitrary age of eighteen. For some it is
not soon enough; for others, it is too soon; but for most, it is an appro-
priate age.
One way in which the indeterminacy of human language and con-
cepts can be dealt with in the computer is by using "fuzzy sets" or
"fuzzy variables"' that is, "classes of objects in which the transition
from membership to non-membership is gradual rather than ab-
rupt. ' 37 According to Professor Lofti Zadeh, the pioneer of what has
become known as fuzzy logic, "Fuzziness... is a concomitant of com-
plexity .... In fact, it is the capability to manipulate fuzzy concepts
that distinguishes human intelligence from the machine intelligence of
current generation computers. ''3
8
B. The Metaphorical Nature of Language
The Swiss linguist, Ferdinand De Saussure, who is generally
credited with being the father of modern linguistics, demonstrated
that the relationship between the linguistic sign and what it signifies is
arbitrary.39 One of the essential problems of language is the nature of
the relationship between words and concepts and the material world
of sensed perception. One of the most common misperceptions which
people have about how language functions is the belief that words get
their meaning by pointing to things. "There is an absolute non-equiv-
alence between discourse and pointing, '40 in that the word cat, for
37. Lofti A. Zadeh, The Birth and Evolution of Fuzzy Logic, 17 INT'L J. GEN. SYs. 95, 99
(1990).
38. Id. at 100.
39. See FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTIcs 67 (1959).
40. JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN: BOOK III, THE PSYCHOSES 1955-
1956, at 137 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & Russell Grigg trans., 1993).
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example, does not get its meaning by pointing to a perceived animal in
the external world, but rather in terms of a discourse which extends
out into a series of contrasts between the organic and the inorganic,
between plants, animals, and humans, which are different forms of
life, and between cats, dogs, rodents, etc., which are different forms of
non-human mammals. The idea that words directly represent some-
thing is an illusion, albeit a common one.41 The word yellow, for ex-
ample, derives its meaning in terms of a system of an already existing
discourse of color in which it is contrasted with other colors such as
blue. The meaning of yellow is formulated within the discourse of col-
ors from which it cannot be separated as a single unit and still retain
its meaning.
FIGURE 2
The approach to language developed by Lacan from the pioneer-
ing work of Saussure furnishes a linguistic foundation upon which to
construct a more robust understanding of how legal discourse func-
tions in the legal process. At the center of this approach is the rela-
tionship between the signifier and the signified which Lacan
diagrammed as "the signifier over the signified," where the bar signi-
fies the separation between the two such that signifiers slide over what
is signified as seen in Figure 2.42 Signifiers get their meaning in rela-
tionship to other signifiers, thus forming chains of meaning.43 Accord-
ing to Lacan, "[f]or language to be born, it must always already be
grasped as a whole."44 "The word can in no way be regarded as a unit
of language, even though it constitutes a privileged elementary
41. See id.
42. JACQUES LACAN, lcRIs 149 (1977).
43. See id. at 150-54.
44. LAcAN, supra note 40, at 228.
[Vol. 73:277
MACHINE INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL REASONING
form. '45 Thus "language is a system of positional coherence .... ",46
Language, according to Lacan, "is at its most effective when it man-
ages to say something by saying something else .... ,,47 "[M]etonymy
exists from the beginning and makes metaphor possible. ' 48 Meta-
phor, however, is opposed to metonymy and operates at a different
level.
49
Saussure classifies the relationships between different terms in a
language as syntagmatic and associative. 50 The relationship between
signifiers is syntagmatic.51 Signifiers form chains of signification
which take the form of regular or orderly collections of statements,
propositions, or doctrines. 52 Some of the syntagmatic relationships
are that of opposition between concepts, derivation of one concept
from another, class and sub-class, and between the universal and the
particular (quantification), the logical relationships between proposi-
tions, and other logical patterns of inference. Saussure points out that
the notion of syntagm applies not only to words but to groups of
words and to complex units of all length and types whether consisting
of compounds or derivatives.53 A chain of signification that consti-
tutes a syntagma generally bears a syntagmatic relationship to other
syntagma. "Between the syntagmatic groupings ... there is a bond of
interdependence; they mutually condition each other. ' 54 As stated by
Lacan, "no signification can be sustained other than by reference to
another signification. '55
Syntagmatic groupings of language at one level of discourse are
associated with other levels of discourse as the signified. 56 The rela-
tionship between signifiers and the signified is thus, metaphorical. An
example of the metaphorical characteristic of legal, political, and
moral arguments, and the arbitrary nature of the relationship between
language that functions as signifiers and language that functions as the
signified can be shown by comparing the different signifiers which
have been applied to the fetus as the signified. Each of the signifiers is
45. Id. at 225.
46. Id. at 226.
47. Id. at 224.
48. Id. at 225.
49. See id. at 227-29.
50. See DE SAUSSURE, supra note 39, at 122-27.
51. See id. at 127.
52. See id. at 70, 115.
53. 'See DE SAUSSUtRa, supra note 39, at 124.
54. Id. at 128.
55. LACAN, supra note 42, at 150.
56. See id. at 157.
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a part of a separate chain of signification which will serve a particular
interest. The signifiers parasite, property, person, soul, and baby all
have been applied to the fetus as the signified. They belong to the
chains of signification of individual autonomy, property rights, human
rights, Christianity, and domestic relations. Each signifier is chosen to
be applied to the signified according to what interest the speaker
seeks to serve, whether that of the mother, the father, the state, the
church, or the fetus itself. Thus in the discourse of disputes which
surround the fetus, the signifiers float without any right, true, or nec-
essary connection. They function metaphorically. The concept of the
fetus, which functions as the signified in moral, political, religious, and
legal discourses, functions as a signifier in biological discourse.
The nature of the relationship between the discourse of legal doc-
trine (the Law) and the discourse of the observations, information,
and data of everyday life (the Facts) is one of the most difficult issues
facing the practitioners of Al and law, working in the area of case-
based reasoning and legal expert systems. If the relationship were
fixed and determinate, our task would not be nearly as difficult as it is.
Because the relationship is indeterminate and shifting, simulating
legal reasoning in the computer presents an overwhelming challenge.
Viewing the discourse of legal doctrine as signifiers and chains of sig-
nification, and the discourse of the material facts of life as the signified
furnishes us with a useful conceptual tool for examining the relation-
ship between what we call the law and the facts.
At times the lawyer starts with a set of facts as a given, and at-
tempts to find sets of legal doctrine which will, when applied to those
facts, produce the result desired by the client. Take, for example, a set
of facts in which a hospital wrongfully posts information that a partic-
ular nurse has had a highly infectious disease, and people assumed
that she had AIDS rather than infectious hepatitis. The cause of ac-
tion could be drafted in any one or more of the following legal actions:
negligence, breach of contract of employment, defamation, or inva-
sion of privacy.57 The law of contracts, the law of defamation, the law
of privacy, and the law of negligence-each are doctrinal sets which
are made up of chains of signification. This discourse is normally
fairly abstract at the purely doctrinal level, and doctrinal arguments
are generally fairly concise because they are frequently circular within
their own frame of reference. The discourse that would be used to
describe the material facts of the situation involving the nurse and the
57. See Peters-Brown v. Regina Dist. Health Bd., [1995] W.W.R. 337, 340-41.
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damage she suffered constitutes the signified. The essence of a legal
argument is to persuade the judge to select as the chains of significa-
tion, a particular doctrinal analysis which, when associated with the
facts of the case, a conclusion favorable to her client will follow as a
matter of course.
On other occasions, the lawyer has located the appropriate legal
doctrine that might produce the desired result, and seeks alternative
fact situations where that same doctrine has been applied in order to
use as precedents. For example let us take the case where a young
female university student is returning to her car in the university park-
ing lot, and while walking down an unlit path bordered by shrubs and
bushes is sexually assaulted. The legal issue is whether or not an occu-
pier of land owes a duty of care to invitees or licensees to take precau-
tions to protect them from the intentional wrongful acts of third
parties. There are a wide range of possibilities that could give rise to
this same legal issue, and consequently would be relevant cases. The
nature of the premises, the occupier's business, the location of the
wrongful act, and the nature of the wrongful act are all variables that
can change and still remain within the range of relevancy. The separa-
tion of the discourse of legal doctrine from the discourse of the mate-
rial facts of life, therefore, not only has a theoretical justification, but a
practical application regarding how we structure and represent legal
knowledge in the computer.
The way in which legal discourse is structured and operates is in-
compatible with the traditional paradigm of Al. Like Descartes's
view of the autonomy of the mind, the conventional notion assumes
that language can function independently of the perceptions of sight,
sound, smell, touch, sensations, and emotions that are deeply-rooted
in the human body. By equating human and machine intelligence, the
traditional perspective implicitly entails the patently false assumption
that the mere manipulation of symbols in the computer can ade-
quately represent languaging processes rooted in perceptions and
emotions. The precise binary and Boolean logical function of the
computer are incongruous with the way humans reduce information
costs through imprecision. The separation between the discourses of
legal doctrine and the discourse of the material facts of life, and the
equivocal and indeterminate nature of the way the one is related to
the other in the processes of legal reasoning, is inconsistent with the
logically based inference models of the prevailing conceptions of AI.
An investigation of the potential for simulating legal thought
processes in the machine requires an understanding of the structure of
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legal doctrinal discourse and how it relates to the facts. In addition,
we will need an alternative view of artificial intelligence that would
permit us to represent the discourse of legal doctrine separately as
signifiers in chains of signification which can then be associated with
the discourse of everyday life in terms of relationships whose struc-
tures can be represented in the machine.
IV. THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL DISCOURSE
The significant feature of signifiers is that they have no meaning
standing by themselves, but only get their meaning in relationship to
other signifiers. Signifiers thus remain as meaningless abstractions un-
til they are associated with something else as a signified. The signi-
fied, itself, is likely to function as a signifier in the context of another
level of discourse. Signifiers thus may be seen as the form of more
familiar things, the signified, so long as we conceive of form as a syn-
tactical structure rather than a physical shape. Pure signifiers, so long
as they are not related to a particular signified, tend to be abstract by
nature or form, empty of content. Thus, in many ways signifiers func-
tion as variables that can be associated with alternative specifics when
given a concrete reference.
A. The Fundamental Signifiers of Legal Doctrine
1. Legal persons
The concept of the legal person furnishes us with a paradigm ex-
ample of a fundamental signifier of legal doctrinal discourse. A legal
person is not the same thing as a human being as not all human beings
are legal persons and not all legal persons are human beings. Legal
persons have no specific meaning in the abstract, but are empty of
content. F. H. Lawson states of the legal person that "[1]egal person-
ality and legal persons are, as it were, mathematical creations devised
for the purpose of simplifying legal calculations." 58 David Derham,
using similar language, writes that the "legal person... is just as much
a pure 'concept' as 'one' is in arithmetic. It is just as independent
from a human being as one is from an 'apple."' 59 The signifier, or
legal person, does not get its meaning by pointing at or standing for an
individual, but rather gets its meaning from its function and position
in the syntagma, legal obligation. Legal persons have syntactical
58. F.H. Lawson, The Creative Use of Legal Concepts, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 909, 915 (1957).
59. David P. Derham, Theories of Legal Personality, in LEGAL PERSONALITY AND POLIT-
ICAL PLURALISM 1, 5 (Leicester C. Webb ed., 1958).
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meaning in that they are either right holders or duty holders in the
fundamental relationship of legal obligation. The right holder may be
associated with a particular individual, or a business, or an association
of people seeking some common purposes such as a trade union or an
association, providing there is a legislative scheme that permits the
group or the association of people to be granted corporate standing.
There are specific kinds of legal persons such as landlords, tenants,
trustees, testators, beneficiaries, etc. each of which gets its meaning in
terms of the bundle of legal relations that constitute the particular
legal interest. Thus the legal interest reversion defines the entity,
landlord; the legal interest leasehold estate in land defines tenant; and
trust defines trustee.
2. Actions
The meaning that links signifiers into chains of signification or
syntagma is multi-relational. Chains of signification are in themselves
related to each other in matrices or webs of meaning. The concept of
personhood derives its meaning in part from the concept or idea of
action, and action gets its meaning in terms of actors or agents who are
particular kinds of persons. Only agents possess full personhood, and
agents are those who have the capacity to perform actions, and actions
are those things which agents can perform. Thus action, in this sense,
is a signifier, and as such is a fundamental variable in the chain of
signification which links legal persons in terms of the relationship of
legal obligation.
Full fledged or standard actions entail certain properties such as
intention. If an essential element of a standard action is missing, then
we have a case of a non-standard act, or an adjusted act. We can as-
sume if someone says that "John shot the donkey," that the action of
shooting the donkey had all of the key elements of a standard act. If,
however, someone says that John shot the donkey unintentionally, ac-
cidentally, mistakenly, carelessly, negligently, inadvertently, or uncon-
sciously, then the action of shooting the donkey is non-standard. Each
of these adjusters negate the presence of an element of a standard act.
When we identify all of the elements which are negated, we will have
the list of characteristics which constitute a standard act.60 The con-
cept of an action in legal doctrinal discourse does not get its meaning
from the various bodily movements people make, but rather from a




theory of the autonomy and responsibility of agents. The various de-
fenses in the criminal law and the law of torts thus relate to the pres-
ence or absence of these elements that constitute a standard action.
3. Things or objects
The actions that constitute the subject matter of legal obligations
are often in relationship to things or objects. Thus the object of the
action constitutes a variable in the chain of signification which makes
up the relationship of legal obligation. The object term of a legal rela-
tion, or a set of them, is not necessarily a physical thing, but may be
immaterial such as a form of intellectual property or other bundle of
legal relations. Again, rather than pointing to a physical object, this
variable term in a legal relation, or set thereof, gets its meaning from
the set of relations within which it functions as a term.
4. The fundamental syntagmatic relation
One of the fundamental signifiers of all normative discourse,
whether moral, legal, or political, is obligation. What one has an obli-
gation to do, one both ought to do and is obliged to do.61 It is the
element of necessity which distinguishes what we ought to do from a
moral point of view, from what we are morally obligated to do. The
meaning of obligation in the abstract comes from a matrix or web of
chains of signification which underlies and furnishes the ideological
foundations for Western social order. While we can maintain a clear
distinction between legal and moral obligations, the signifier obliga-
tion, as it functions in each context, nevertheless shares many chains
of meaning such as those relating to individual responsibility and the
nature and structure of agency and action.
B. Some Fundamental Syntactical Properties of Legal Relations
1. Universalizability
The essential logical property of normative (as contrasted with
merely descriptive) propositions about the existence or non-existence
of a legal obligation is that it is universalizable. The universalizability
of legal judgments about obligations underlies a series of legal doc-
trines such as the doctrine of precedent that like cases shall be decided
alike, equality before the law, equality under the law, justice as equal
61. See J.C. SMrrH, LEGAL OBLIGATION 34-59 (1976) [hereinafter LEGAL OBLIGATION].
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treatment, the duty of judicial impartiality, and others.62 A normative
statement that a particular person ought to do something is equivalent
in meaning to a proposition that there are good reasons for that per-
son to do that action. Reasons for action entail assumptions about
cause-effect relationships between actions and desired states of affairs.
Thus, in the final analysis, the universalizability of normative judg-
ments is founded upon the consistency of cause and effect in that like
causes have like effects. It logically follows that if, prescriptively, it is
the case that a person has a legal obligation to do a particular act, then
it is the case that that person ought to do that act. In which case, it
follows that: Any judgment made in regard to a particular sititation,
that a particular person is or is not legally obligated to do a particular
act, logically entails that the judgment instances a rule of law such that
anyone in a relevantly similar situation is or is not legally obligated to
do the same act. All criteria of relevancy are teleological. Universal-
izability functions in normative legal discourse to maintain a teleologi-
cal consistency within the legal system.
2. Opposition
The relationship of opposition between concepts is an important
element of meaning by which signifiers are differentiated in relation-
ship to each other. Opposition is not the same thing as negation.
Bachelor and spinster are oppositional terms, but neither is the nega-
tion of the other. While it is the case that a bachelor is not a spinster,
it does not follow front the statement, It is not the case that a particular
person is a bachelor, that the person is a spinster. An oppositional
relationship between two signifiers entails that they are opposed to
each other within the framework of a common relationship, that of
marriage. While both negate the condition of marriage, they are op-
positional vis-A-vis each other.
The fundamental relation of law is that of legal obligation. Legal
obligation is a three-term relation connecting two legal persons in re-
gard to a particular act or pattern of behavior. In regard to any two
legal persons and any particular act, one person will have the obliga-
tion to perform the act, the duty, and the other person will have the
claim that the act be performed, the right. A right is equivalent to the
three term relationship of legal obligation viewed from the perspec-
tive of the particular person having the benefit of the relationship. A
duty is equivalent to the same three term relation viewed from the
62. See id. at 88-108.
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perspective of the person having the burden of the relationship. Thus,
rights and duties are oppositional.
3. Negation
Any proposition can be negated in some form or other. If the
proposition expresses that something is the case, then it can be put in
a negative form that something is not the case. Or if the proposition
expresses that something is true, then the proposition can be negated
by adding the term "not." Propositions can also contain negation
within. Actions can be done or not done. Thus, negation can function
within a proposition about legal obligations at two points, acting and
not acting, and the existence or non-existence of the relationship it-
self. The relation of legal obligation can be expressed as the proposi-
tional form: A particular person has a duty to another particular person
to do a particular act. The same relationship can be expressed in its
negative form as: It is not the case that a particular person has a right
that another particular person do a particular act. We can also express
the negation of action as: It is the case that a particular person has a
legal obligation to refrain from (not do) a particular act. Thus through
using negation at these two points, we can create four kinds of pro-
positional forms relating to the existence or non-existence of an obli-
gation to do, or not to do, a particular act.
4. Logical implications
These four propositions can be placed at the four corners of the
traditional Aristotelian Square of Opposition:63
63. See R.E. Robinson et al., The Logic of Rights, 33 U. TORONTO L.J. 267, 274-75 (1983).
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A. The duty holder is legally obligated to the right holder to do a
particular action.
I. It is not the case that the duty holder is legally obligated to the
right holder to do a particular action.
E. The duty holder is legally obligated to the right holder to re-
frain from doing a particular action.
0. It is not the case the duty holder is legally obligated to the
right holder to refrain from doing a particular action.
By placing these propositional forms at the appropriate corners
of the square of oppositions, the logical relations that hold between




X has a duty
to Y todoC
Y has a o
s right against







X has a duty
to Y to not
todoC Yhasa
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Depending upon the truth values of A, E, I, and 0, there are
three possible states for the square of opposition: in state 3, the duty
holder has neither a duty to do the particular act nor a duty to refrain
State 2 State 3
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from doing it. In that case, she can be said to be free or to have a
choice to do or not do it, thus having a legal liberty or privilege. A
liberty is equivalent to the negation of a legal obligation to do a partic-
ular act and the negation of a legal obligation to refrain from doing
the act.
5. Quantification
The entity variables for any relation or set of relations can be
either particularly or universally quantified. Every entity variable has
a universe of discourse in terms of which the variable will be given a
concrete value. Thus if the variable is particularly quantified, the rela-
tionship will only be true for some of the specific, values of the uni-
verse of discourse. If the variable is universally quantified, then the
relationship will hold true for every instance of the entities which
make up the universe of discourse. The classical distinction between
rights in rem and rights in personam reflect the syntactical property of
quantification. Legal relations can be grouped in sets to create legal
interests such as contracts. We can differentiate between four differ-
ent kinds of legal relations or sets of legal relations in terms of how
the entity variables of right and duty holders are quantified. They are:
a. Contract - The duties and rights are between particular legal
persons.
b. Property - The duties fall on everyone but only particular per-
sons have the rights.
c. Public Law - The particular public officials have the duties but
everyone has the rights.
d. Tort Law - Everyone has the duties and everyone has the rights.
6. Classification
Legal relations such as rights, duties, privileges, and liberties are
generally grouped together into sets such as contracts, property,
trusts, mortgages, patents, copyrights, etc. From the existence of prac-
tices where we are free to create, terminate, or transfer legal relations,
we postulate the existence of powers. Legal powers have their origin
in the performative rules which prescribe how the practices are to be
invoked.
Sets of legal relations may be made more complex by adding fur-
ther variables. By adding the concept of an object to a set of legal
relations we can construct the bundle of rights that constitute prop-
erty. The legal relations, whether rights, duties, liberties, privileges, or
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powers, that make up the set which constitute property contain at
least four terms: the right holder, the holders of the duties, the pat-
terns of behaviors or acts that are permitted or prohibited, and the
object to which the patterns of behavior relate. Property rights can be
made even more complex by adding the variable of time. Estates in
land are bundles of rights relating to realty or funds, which are viewed
as extending on a plane of time. Thus the presence of the time varia-
ble can be used to distinguish the sets of rights that constitute personal
property from the sets of rights that constitute an estate in realty or
funds. The time element in estates will have one of each of four sets
of properties:
1. Infinite or Finite
2. Definite or Indefinite
3. Present or Future
4. Absolute or Defeasible (conditional)
7. Hierarchy
Hierarchical structures are found throughout law. Most legal
concepts have a variety of hierarchical relationships to other legal
concepts. The classification of estates, for example, reflects the fol-
lowing hierarchical configuration:
[Vol. 73:277
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8. Chaining
A further kind of complexity is possible in that the object of
property relations can include sets of legal relations as well as material
land and objects. We can therefore have a set of legal relations as the
object of a further set of legal relations. The situation of the ordinary
householder constitutes at least four levels of sets of legal relations
between the human beings and the actual land and home. Thus, Mary
Jones (1) owns (2) a tenancy-in-common in (3) an equity of redemption
in (4) a fee simple. Joint tenancies and tenancies-in-common are sets
of relations which allow more than one person to co-own a piece of
property. They function to regulate the rights, duties, liberties, and
powers as between the co-owners. Mortgages constitute a security in-
terest whereby the mortgagor has certain rights to the property as se-
curity for a debt, while the person holding the equity of redemption
has certain rights of use and enjoyment, including the right to pay off
the indebtedness and remove the mortgage. Thus people can have
almost all of the benefits of ownership without the full capital outlay.
At the end of these sets of doctrinal .chains of signification is the mate-
rial and visual piece of earth and the buildings that stand upon it,
which is the material factual content that functions as the final signi-
fied at the end of this set of complex chains of legal relations.
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEGAL DOCTRINE AND THE
MATERIAL FACTS OF LIFE
The functions of the lawyer may be roughly divided into two
branches-legal advising, drafting, and conveyancing, and litigation
and dispute settlement. The former looks to the future and plans be-
havior, and the latter looks, to the past, to correct what has gone
wrong. The former attempts to shape the material facts of life for the
future, while the latter deals with the past where the facts are fixed.
The former is a matter of creative planning and falls within the prac-
tice of the solicitor, while the latter deals with pathology or what has
gone wrong, and how best to correct it, and falls within the traditional
role of the barrister. These two functions are closely interrelated in
the sense that if something is not done correctly or some unseen event
arises in the former, then litigation may follow. Work in the field of
Al and law is relevant to both kinds of function. Much has been done
in the field of automatic document assembly, even though this area of
law and computers has not caught the attention or interest of those
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working in the field of AI and law as much as has case-based
reasoning.
A. Advising, Drafting, and Conveyancing
When a group of business people wish to pool their assets in or-
der to create a business, the function of the lawyer is to construct the
legal framework that will accomplish their desires. Because they wish
to raise more capital, the lawyer constructs a public corporation rather
than a partnership or some alternative form. A great many contracts
would be entered into. It would be the function of the lawyer to be-
come, as far as possible, aware of all the risks so that the parties could
agree on where they were to lie. Shares would be sold, and further
capital might be raised through the sale of corporate bonds. The cor-
poration itself, when the incorporation was complete, would purchase
and own assets, and enter into contracts in its own right. The articles
and memoranda of incorporation would set out the various legal rela-
tionships holding between a variety of the legal entities involved. If
the lawyer has accomplished the task well, that is to say if the lawyer is
fully knowledgeable regarding the legal rules and selects the appropri-
ate legal instruments and drafts the documents clearly, no problems
should arise.
It is the function of the lawyer to select the appropriate legal
practice (doctrinal area of law) to accomplish what the client desires.
For example, let us assume that the client is a wealthy married woman
in her late seventies, lives in a jurisdiction that imposes an inheritance
tax on death, and requests her lawyer to draft her will. The lawyer
will explain that if she leaves everything to her husband, who then
leaves everything to their children, the estate will pay a heavy succes-
sion duty on the death of each parent. If, however, the survivor is
given a life estate and the children vested remainders, the estate is
only taxed once as the children will take a vested remainder on the
death of the first parent. 64 There is a functional or teleological history
behind the evolution of the law of property reflecting the interest of
families in accumulating property and controlling it after death, and a
public interest in the devolution and taxation of property and the limi-
tation of the control of the dead hand.
If, in the above example, the wealthy client is concerned about
her spouse's capacity to manage her estate if she predeceases him, the
lawyer will likely suggest a trust where the surviving spouse can have
64. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 2056 (1994) (providing for federal taxation of survivor's estate).
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the rights of beneficial enjoyment without the rights and powers of
control. The set of relations that constitute a property interest can, in
addition to being divisible on the plane of time, be split into two sets
- those which constitute the rights, liberties and powers that relate to
control, and those which constitute the rights and liberties of benefi-
cial enjoyment. The former are held by the Trustee, and the latter are
held by the Cestui Que Trust.65
The distinction between legal doctrine and the material facts of
life underlie nearly every aspect of the practice of law. A contract, in
the abstract, as a signifier, is an empty form to which we can associate
different persons in regard to different patterns of action. There is no
necessary or fixed relationship between any particular set of legal doc-
trinal structures and any particular material facts. We construct and
structure the future by selecting the appropriate doctrinal structures
that will accomplish our goals. The relationships between the con-
cepts that constitute a particular legal doctrine such as Property or
Contract are syntactical, but when we call a particular transaction a
lease or a license, the relationships between the concepts and the par-
ticular set of facts are associative according to our teleological needs.
B. Adjudication
Contrast the above with the following: an elderly gentleman is
crossing the street at an intersection having a traffic light and is struck
by a car. Both the elderly pedestrian and the driver experience cer-
tain perceptions. Both parties to the accident will commence to re-
construct the events so as to minimize their responsibility. When a
client has been involved in a traffic accident, lawyer and client seek, if
possible, to conceptualize the event in the form of a story script which
is about cause and fault, blame, and responsibility. The cause-blame
script is associated with particular kinds of events, in order to obtain a
particular result. Legal reasoning is reiterative as between the facts
and the law as the lawyer seeks to conceptualize the facts into a script
which can be associated with a legal doctrine which, if applied, will
achieve the desired result, and at the same time shape the legal doc-
trine to fit the script, as limited by the events. A decided case consists
of a script which is then associated with a doctrinal chain of significa-
tion. These scripts, in terms of which we think as lawyers, determine
the boundaries of relevancy.
65. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 208 (5th ed. 1979).
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Just how do we as lawyers think when we approach a legal prob-
lem? The discourse of legal doctrine is generally independent of any
particular factual situation, but instead is often conceived of in rela-
tionship to broad factual themes or scripts. A script is a kind of story
line, where the main items are variable. We conceive, for example, of
the tort of assault and battery to the person in broad abstract terms
that can take a wide variety of specific instances, such as a blow with
the fist, striking with a club, or simply giving an unwanted and unsolic-
ited kiss. The lawyer's function in adjudication is to select a legal doc-
trinal structure that can be related to a factual script or story that can
match the factual reconstruction of the events through the testimony
of witnesses, as shaped by the rules of evidence and court procedure.
The typical legal dispute generally starts with an event or set of
events of some kind or other. People then conceptualize the events in
the form of stories, which are descriptions of what took place. Natu-
rally the stories of the two participants in a dispute will give different
versions of the events. Lawyers conceptualize facts in the form of
scripts, or story patterns, which are shaped by the interests and objec-
tives of their clients. As an example take the case where a women has
entered into and proceeded with a surrogate mother contract, and
then changes her mind after the birth of the baby. Assuming that the
court refuses to enforce the contract on the grounds that it is against
public policy, the courts still have permitted the biological father to
make a claim to the infant.66 The issue could be conceptualized as
being similar to an adoption contract where a pregnant women agrees
to deliver up the child at birth to an infertile couple for adoption. The
case would be similar in that a contract to surrender the child after its
birth exists, but it is different in that the other contracting parties have
no biological relationship to the child. If this doctrinal conceptualiza-
tion was used, the mother would likely win as courts are reluctant to
enforce such contracts as they discourage unwed mothers to make
prior arrangements for giving up a child for adoption. It could be con-
ceptualized as a biological father seeking custody of a child born out
of wedlock. This conceptualization would be similar in that the dis-
pute would be between two biological parents, but it would be differ-
ent in that there is an absence of a contract. The father would be
unlikely to win using such a conceptualization as the courts do not
look with sympathy upon males who impregnate women to whom
they are not married. The issue could be conceptualized as a custody
66. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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dispute in which case it would be similar in that the contest would be
between two biological parents, but it would be different in that the
biological parents would have never been married to each other. With
this form of doctrinal conceptualization it is likely that the biological
father will win given that the test being what is likely to be in the best
interest of the child, because the father, being more wealthy than a
woman who is likely driven to contract out her womb out of financial
necessity, will be in a better financial position to provide for the child.
Thus there are three possible ways in which the dispute can be con-
ceptualized, each in some ways similar, and each in some ways differ-
ent, two which would favor the mother, and one which would favor
the father. The issue is as good as decided as soon as the judge adopts
the particular form of conceptualization.
VI. MACHINE LANGUAGE AND REASONING
According to Terry Winograd, the field of artificial intelligence
"has not achieved creativity, insight and judgment," nor have we "yet
been able to construct a machine with even a modicum of common
sense or one that can converse on everyday topics in ordinary lan-
guage. ' ' 67 He goes on to point out that "[t]he source of the difficulties
will not be found in the details of silicon micro-circuits or of Boolean
logic," but that the "basic philosophy that has guided the research is
shallow and inadequate, ' 68 drawn as it is from the outmoded tradi-
tions of rationalism and logical empiricism rooted in the ideas of
mechanized reasoning that Descartes and Leibnitz, among others,
found so attractive. The computer is not intelligent. Machines do not
think. Yet they are the product of intelligence. Information in digital
form is used to symbolically represent the perceptual-conceptual sys-
tem, and eventually that information is transformed back into the
form of visual patterns and natural language. It would never occur to
us to think of a book as being intelligent, no matter how profound its
content. No one speaks of book or print intelligence. We store infor-
mation in books and we store information in computers. Is the differ-
ence between the two (the fact that information can be processed in
the computer), so significant that we are justified in imputing intelli-
gence to one and not to the other?
Most who are familiar with the field of. artificial intelligence
would agree with the theorist who, in discussing the paradigmatic con-
67. Winograd, supra note 28, at 167.
68. Id.
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fusion surrounding Al, states that "[i]n spite of what I regard as Al's
significant achievements ... the not so well-kept secret is that Al is
internally in a paradigmatic mess. There is really no broad agreement
on the essential nature or formal basis of intelligence and the proper
theoretical framework for it."'69 Machine or artificial intelligence is a
metaphor. We use metaphors to refer to something new which is dif-
ferent from everything else, but has sufficient similarities to sustain a
metaphorical reference. The following is the best definition of artifi-
cial intelligence that I can think of. Artificial intelligence is what ever
we would like to make the computer do which humans can do, but we
do not quite know how to make the computer do it, but on the other
hand, we think that there is a distinct possibility that we can make the
computer do it. Yet if and when we actually do succeed in making the
computer do it, then it is no longer artificial intelligence but pattern
matching or something else equally mundane. The Holy Grail always
becomes a tin cup once we have obtained it.
A. The Logical Structure of Machine Language
Machines have no consciousness, no self, and no perception, but
they do have language. Machine language, however, is very different
from human language in that machine language is not a symbolic rep-
resentational system for the machine, but is a symbolic representa-
tional system for human language. At the most fundamental level of
its symbolic representational system, the computer can have only two
states, the presence or absence of an electromagnetic phenomenon.
Thus any information that a computer can process, whether words,
graphics, or sound, is represented in the computer .in terms of binary
numbers.
Boolean logic, with its three fundamental operations, AND, OR,
and NOT, will process two kinds of entities such as true or false, yes or
no, open or closed, on or off, or 0 or 1. The convergence of Boolean
logic with binary mathematics thus forms the underlying structure of
computer design. When on or off switches are arranged according to
Boolean principles, circuits can be created that can perform both
mathematical and logical operations. Simple AND, OR, and NOT
gates can be combined in a large number of complex ways permitting
the performance of complex logical and mathematical calculations.
By representing letters with binary numbers, the computer can repre-
69. B. Chandrasekaran, What Kind of Information Processing is Intelligence?, in FOUNDA-
TIONS, supra note 28, at 14.
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sent and manipulate human language. Information passes between
the human and the machine through at least three levels of represen-
tation. Each level has its own kind of language or languages. The first
level is that of binary machine language which is machine readable
only. The third level is natural language which is human readable
only. Connecting the two are a set of programming languages which
are readable by both the human and the machine.
Machines can perform complex mathematical and logical calcula-
tions at a speed and complexity far beyond that of any human being.
Computers can outperform even the world class chess masters.70 Yet
a child of three can far outperform the computer in the manipulation
and use of natural language. If intelligence entails consciousness-the
self, perception, as well as language-then there is only human intelli-
gence. If we take the Church-Thring thesis seriously, then we must
look upon the computer as an idiot savant, so far as intelligence is
concerned. It can barely manage to use natural language, but can bril-
liantly solve mathematical and logical problems. Language is consti-
tuted by complex webs, chains, and matrices of semantic and syntactic
structures which do not remain fixed. Some working in the field of Al
recognize that "even science is not the paradigm of literal language it
was once considered to be; rather, metaphor is vital to the modeling
processes that result in advances in science," and that "metaphor may
be the very heart of how we think and learn. '71
B. The Limits of Machine Reasoning
Artificial, mathematical, and logical languages are infinitely too
simplistic to deal with the complexity and indeterminacy which sur-
rounds human action and conflicts of interest. Anne Von der Leith
Gardner in her book, An Artificial Intelligence Approach to Legal
Reasoning, attempted to simulate the legal reasoning process around
the issue of offer and acceptance in the law of contracts. 72 The basic
conclusion one has to reach after reading the book is that even a sin-
gle issue of law was too complex to be effectively simulated as a deci-
sion-process in the computer. 73 The machine could handle only
straight-forward, clear, obvious cases. The value of the book lies in its
70. See Bruce Weber, Computer Defeats Kasparov, Stunning the Chess Experts, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 1997, at B2.
71. EILEEN CORNELL WAY, KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION AND METAPHOR 8-9 (1991).
72. See ANNE VON DER LIETH GARDNER, AN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE APPROACH TO
LEGAL REASONING 24-26 (1987).
73. See id.
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demonstration of the difficulties of representing the process of legal
reasoning in case-based law even for a single legal issue. Kevin
Ashley, in his book entitled Modeling Legal Argument, describes
HYPO, his case-based reasoner.74 HYPO, however, handles only a
relatively small number of cases in an artificial situation.75 Ashley's
pioneering work in case-based reasoning reflects just how difficult it is
for the computer to handle issues of relevancy in the simplest of
situations.
The reality of legal reasoning is far too complex to describe and
comprehensively represent. The best that one can accomplish in the
field of artificial intelligence and legal reasoning is to create models
which can simulate legal reasoning in a small and limited area. Any
model of a knowledge-based system of the law will be subject to the
limitations of selection which are required because of the complexity
of the law and of the legal reasoning process as carried out by human
beings.
VI. How HUMAN INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS
The mathematician Zdzislaw Melzak refers to a measurement
made some time ago by certain scientists of a change of dimension of
forty microns, about the width of a human hair.76 What he points out
as interesting was not the minuteness of the change, as much finer
measurements had been made much earlier, but that the measure-
ment was of a change in the diameter of a neutron star at a distance of
several thousand light years away in the Crab nebula.77 This certainly
furnishes us with a magnificent product of human intelligence. He
further points out, however, that the method used was based on prin-
ciples developed by Thales over twenty five hundred years ago to
measure the height of an Egyptian pyramid. 78 It is a difficult task to
directly measure the height of a pyramid because one would have to
drill a hole from its top and drop a measuring line or rope down to its
base. Thales merely used his similarity theorem which provides that
triangles with the same angles are similar.79 According to Melzak,
Thales managed to avoid the difficult method of measurement by:
74. See K.D. ASHLEY, MODELING LEGAL ARGUMENT: REASONING WITH CASES AND Hy-
POTHETICALS (1990).
75. See id.
76. See Zdzislaw A. Melzak, Thales Revisited, 83 Eos 203 (1995).
77. See id. at 205.
78. See id. at 204-05.
79. See id. at 204.
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the use of his theorem which employs the similarity structure and
allows the crucial introduction of proportion: the unknown height H
of the pyramid is to the length of its known shadow S as the known
height h of a vertical stick is to the stick's known shadow-length s.
Thus the unknown height H is obtained from the simple proportion
H:S = h:s. 80
One of the more striking manifestations of intelligence is the ca-
pacity of humans to carry out a difficult task by creatively transform-
ing it into the form of a number of simpler tasks, and then
reconstructing it in a more complex form in order to achieve a desired
objective. 81 Melzak calls this process the bypass principle which "is a
way of dealing with complexity or with difficulty by means of a bypass
which promotes a transport or a passage or the solution of a problem
in a three-stage reduction process whose first and last stages are each
other's inverses. ' 82 Speech is transformed by being represented by
letters which can then be easily carried far beyond the range of the
human voice. Words can be represented in the form of clicks of a
telegraph key, which in turn become electrical impulses, which after
passing through a wire are turned back into clicks, which are inter-
preted as words. Many of the more complex actions that best reflect
human intelligence follow a pattern whereby a very difficult task is
broken down into or transformed into a representation in a much sim-
pler form. 83 In this form, a set of easy tasks can then be carried out.
When, through a process of inverse transformation, the representation
is returned to its original form, the original task is completed. Through
the use of our intelligence, we accomplish the original hard task, and
thus a complicated process makes a hard task easy. This gives us the
formula:
DIFFICULT TASK to SIMPLIFIED TRANSFORMATION to a set
of EASIER TASKS to an inverse SIMPLIFIED TRANSFORMA-
TION to the COMPLETED TASK.
Before writing existed, passing down the history and culture of a
group was a difficult task. In each generation, people had to acquire
the information from the elders, memorize it, and pass it on to the
next generation. With the evolution of writing, the concepts and cor-
responding sounds of the language were encoded into a visual symbol-
ism, recorded, and then decoded in the process of reading. When
language first evolved, it existed first as an oral tradition. Representa-
80. Id. at 205.
81. See MELZAK, supra note 9, at 3-4.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 4 (discussing Melzak's bypass principle).
[Vol. 73:277
MACHINE INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL REASONING
tions of memory could be passed on from generation to generation.
With the evolution of writing, visual symbols could be used to repre-
sent the systems of sounds. These symbols could be given a more last-
ing form by inscription in material ranging from stone to papyrus to
paper. The literate tradition took a revolutionary form with the devel-
opment of the printing press. With the more recent development of
digital technology, we enter a new era in the symbolic representation
of human thought.
VIII. CAN COMPUTERS RESOLVE LEGAL ISSUES?
Expert systems are. the closest approximation to human reason
that have yet been devised in the field of artificial intelligence. Expert
systems are computer programs based on various artificial intelligence
techniques, which perform generally specific and difficult tasks at the
level of a human expert.84 Expert systems often are constituted by
three parts: a knowledge base, an inference engine which manipulates
the knowledge base, and explanatory and informational material sup-
plied to the user. 85 Expert systems can be constructed in special pro-
gramming languages or they can be created through the use of
commercially available shells.86 They can be written in either a logic-
based or an object-oriented language, and they can function as a rule-
based or case-based reasoner. If computers can be made to resolve
legal issues, expert systems and case-based reasoning technology are
likely to furnish us with the best tools.
Legal knowledge is technical, yet it does not have the conceptual
clarity of the natural sciences. Lawyers think axiomatically, 87 yet the
law cannot be put into the form of a deductive system. Law is a sys-
tematic body of knowledge, yet at the same time it is not necessarily
consistent. Law is said to be rational, but not all legal arguments can
be put into the form of logical syllogisms. The complexity of legal
discourse is directly related to the nature and variety of the functions
which it must serve, ranging from shaping the future to correcting the
past, and to the complexity of the relationship between the doctrinal
discourse of the law and the material facts of life to which that dis-
course is applied.
84. See, e.g., DONALD A. WATERMAN, A GUIDE TO EXPERT SYSTEMS 1-60 (1986).
85. See Richard Forsyth, The Architecture of Expert Systems, in EXPERT SYSTEMS 9 (Rich-
ard Forsyth ed., 1984).
86. See WATERMAN, supra note 84, at 339-65.
87. See Juan Miquel, Stoic Logic and Roman Jurisprudence, in THE WESTERN IDEA OF LAW
333 (J.C. Smith & David N. Weisstub eds., 1983).
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Legal reasoning is universalizable in that relevantly like cases are
to be decided alike. When one case is like another, there will also be
differences, but the differences will not be considered to be relevant.
Legal reasoning, therefore, has a metaphorical structure in that when
a term is used as a metaphor in a different context, the new reference
must have similarities but also differences. Metaphor is not simply a
peripheral device, but is central to language in that human cognition
moves from the known and the familiar to the new and the different.
Case-based reasoning, precedent, and reasoning by analogy are basi-
cally metaphorical by nature because one is moving from the known
and familiar.to the new, and somewhat different. Metaphorical rea-
soning requires criteria of relevancy in order to identify the differ-
ences which are not relevant, and the similarities which are.
Relevancy is measured in terms of what is significant or important as
affecting an outcome or a result.
Case-based reasoning has low information costs. If an actor can
follow a prior procedure to get the same desired results, the individual
need not understand the workings of the process, nor obtain new in-
formation in order to obtain the desired ends. Following a precedent
justified in doctrinal terms is a very economical way of reasoning be-
cause it avoids the necessity of an extensive study of the impact or
potential results of the alternative choices. Precedential reasoning re-
quires little external information beyond the specific facts of the case.
This method of argumentation attempts to find the best match as be-
tween the facts of a case and the facts of a precedent within the con-
fines of doctrinal structures that require no external factual
justification.
If each litigant in each case had to directly justify their claim in
terms of economic, moral, or public policy considerations, the infor-
mation costs would be considerable. Argument by precedent, how-
ever, avoids just this very type of argument which, although highly
relevant, would add tremendous costs to the litigation process. Case-
based reasoning entails the assumption that if a new dispute is similar
to a correctly decided case in all relevant respects, then the resolution
of the new dispute will be right and just if the same resolution is
adopted for the new case. One significant characteristic of case-based
reasoning in law is that the criteria of relevancy are rarely fully articu-
lated. One might well infer from this feature that legal reasoning is
based on widely shared assumptions about what is important, and that
the information costs of arguing these assumptions in each case would
outweigh any benefit to be gained.
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A. Hard Cases
If the relationship between legal doctrine and the material facts
of life were fixed, or strictly rule-governed, then the task of simulating
legal reasoning in the machine would be feasible, albeit complex. Un-
fortunately, however, that is not the case. The relationship of legal
doctrine to facts in the context of litigation is such that it appears to
many that the judge can exercise a discretionary choice as between
several possible forms of doctrinal classifications or conceptualiza-
tions, and the doctrine is often bifurcated between opposing sets of
concepts, rules or norms, and conflicting policies.
On the other hand, most members of the legal profession can tell
the difference between good and bad legal arguments and forms of
legal reasoning. Only a small percentage of disputes are litigated, and
lawyers generally know when and when not to settle when a legal
point is in issue. We can safely assume, therefore, that the relation-
ship between legal doctrine and the material facts of life is not simply
random. And if not random, then it must follow some kind of struc-
ture. While it probably is the case that there is no such thing as one
and only one right answer to every legal issue or dispute, we can prob-
ably assume that of any two possible alternative answers leading to
different legal results, one generally can justify one alternative as a
better answer than the other. If all the above is true, while the courts
are generally faced with hard cases, we can assume that they will sel-
dom be faced with impossible cases to decide. Hard cases, therefore,
are an inevitable aspect of law.
88
There are many sources of indeterminacy in legal reasoning, and
several different methods might be used to describe and categorize
them. The nature of the indeterminacies will probably differ from one
field of law to another while other patterns of indeterminacy may pre-
vail throughout all parts of the law. What is common to all, however,
is that the greater the degree of indeterminacy, the less rule-governed
the area of law will be, and consequently the less will be the degree of
predictability of outcome for any set of facts raising a legal issue, and
the more difficult it will be to program a machine to resolve such a
legal issue.




While in many areas of the law there is a significant amount of
indeterminacy within legal doctrine itself, the substantial area of inde-
terminacy is found at the point where the legal doctrine is associated
with the material facts of life which gave rise to the dispute. Tradi-
tional legal theories can all be conceived in terms of their presupposi-
tions regarding language and how legal discourse relates to the
material facts of life. Natural law and rights theories, for instance,
presuppose that the relationship between legal discourse and the dis-
course surrounding the material facts of life, both of the human and of
nature, is a fixed one.89 A law is unjust if the legal discourse of rights,
duties, and liberties is applied to the material facts of life in a way
contrary to the true nature of humans and their natural environment.
Legal Positivism, on the other hand, views the relationship as fixed by
the conventions which determine political-legal jurisdictional validity,
and where the rules on this are not clear, the judge has a discretion.90
American Legal Realism, on the other hand, assumes that the rela-
tionship is more random, leaving judges with a significant amount of
discretion as to what legal doctrines they use to conceptualize a set of
facts.91
The University of British Columbia ("UBC") Faculty of Law Ar-
tificial Intelligence Research ("FLAIR") Project had its origins in a
three year cooperative project between UBC and IBM (Canada).
FLAIR, from the beginning, pursued a theoretical vision, having as its
objective the integration of a particular paradigm of artificial intelli-
gence with psycholinguistics and legal theory. Our first project was to
test the validity of a particular theory of the nature and structure of
the relationship between legal doctrine and the material facts of life,
which we have characterized as teleo-analytic jurisprudence. Teleo-
analytic jurisprudence assumes that the relationship between the tech-
nical doctrinal discourse of the law and the material facts of life is
teleological, and that the validity of a legal judgment can be measured
in terms of the consistency of the ordering of goals with that already
embodied in the law.92 This ordering, in turn, is evaluated as good or
just according to how well it reflects the shared ordering of goals of
the particular society.
89. See LEGAL OBLIGATION, supra note 61, at 4-7.
90. See id. at 7-13.
91. See id. at 13-21.
92. See id. See generally COVAL & SMrT, supra note 60.
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Our first project was the development of a methodology for simu-
lating case-based reasoning in the computer through representing the
ordering and relationships of the underlying teleological or goal struc-
tures of the law. We were able to construct successfully a number of
expert systems which can give an opinion on a difficult legal issue in
the particular areas of law covered by the system. The legal knowl-
edge contained within the system is represented by taking legal doc-
trine and doctrinal rules, and through the process of simplified
transformation, representing them in terms of the goals and their or-
dering which underlie the law. The goals and their ordering are,
through further simplified transformation, simplified into multiple sets
of single more precise individual factual rules which reflect the under-
lying teleological structure which gave rise to the legal ordering. The
user is asked a series of questions which require only answers of a
factual nature relating to the specific problem, after which the system
responds with a predicted legal outcome.
In order to create case-based reasoners and expert systems which
can resolve disputes, the patterns of consistency by which legal doc-
trine (chains of signification) are associated with the material facts of
life (the signified) must be identified and represented in the system.
The doctrinal rules of law and legal concepts cannot be used as the
knowledge base of the system. At the purely doctrinal level, legal
rules are circular because the relationship between the concepts is
syntactical and formal. There can be no liability in the law of negli-
gence, for example, unless there is a duty of care. The existence of a
duty of care, however, is always considered to be a question of law. If
an interest in land gives the right to exclusive possession, then it is a
property rather than a contractual interest; and if an occupier has a
property interest, then they will have the right to exclusive possession.
If, on the other hand, legal rules are expressed in terms of both facts
and law, the number of rules and exceptions would be totally unman-
ageable. It would be impossible, for example, to have a set of rules
which would be decisive for all of the factual situations in which the
law would recognize or not recognize a duty of care. One can state a
doctrinal rule that intent is a necessary element for a killing to consti-
tute first degree murder. One cannot, however, derive a set of rules
which can decisively determine for each case of a homicide whether or
not there was an intent. On the one hand, if a legal rule is purely
doctrinal, then any justification it furnishes to a factual situation will
be circular; on the other hand, if the justification for the decision is
factual, it will not be rule-like or rule-governed. Applying our para-
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digm of artificial intelligence, we have sought to represent cases in
terms of a simplified transformation which can be represented in the
machine and handled in a computational manner. Where it is possible
to recognize the patterns of consistency which constitute the associa-
tive relationship between the legal doctrinal structures and the mate-
rial facts of a case, these patterns can function as a deep structure
which can be represented in the knowledge base of an expert system
or case-based reasoner.
1. Remoteness of damages
The law of remoteness of damages in negligence is an example of
one of the most indeterminate, ambiguous, and bifurcated areas of
legal doctrine.93 The issue of remoteness of damages relates to the
limits of liability for damages resulting from a negligent act. The
problem of remoteness of damages arises from the fact that a wide
variety of consequential damages and losses can follow from an act of
negligence in addition to those readily foreseeable. The harmful con-
sequences of a negligent act are often multiple rather than single.
One harmful consequence can often lead to another. As a result of an
accident caused by the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff might re-
quire medical treatment which may produce further harmful conse-
quences. Physical injury may cause further economic loss. Each
particular harm must be dealt with separately in ascertaining whether,
for purposes of recovery of damages, it is or is not too remote.
Because there has always been two sets of conflicting tests, one
being defendant-oriented, favoring a narrow range of recovery, and
the other being plaintiff-oriented, favoring a wider range of liability
for causally related damage, 94 it would appear that judges have a com-
plete discretion as to where they draw the line of recovery down the
chain of events which follow a negligent act, beyond which a particu-
lar loss or injury will be too remote. If the judge wishes to find the
damage too remote then she will use a strict foreseeability test.95 On
the other hand, if she wishes to give recovery for the damage, she will
use a causation test such as "proximate" or "direct" cause. 96 The for-
mer favors freedom of action by placing narrower limits on the range
93. See J.C. SMrrH, LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE 91-175 (1984) (discussing why ascertaining a
rational basis for prediction of judicial decisions in remoteness cases is problematic).
94. See id. at 93-100.
95. See id. at 111.
96. See id.
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of risk, while the latter favors compensation for loss by extending the
boundaries of liability.
The point of balance between these two conflicting goals of the
law can be stated in the form of a deep structure rule:
Damages resulting from a negligent action are not too remote if
they are reasonably foreseeable in the particular, or, if not, are one
of a foreseeable class of damages.
97
Although often a particular damage may not be reasonably fore-
seeable, it is reasonably foreseeable: 1) that dangerous activities when
carried out negligently create a wide variety of particular kinds of
risks of harm; 2) that injury to persons can also result in further dam-
age from particular susceptibilities or medical complications to the in-
jured person or to others; and 3) that the creation of a risk invites
rescue.98 From the ultra-hazardous category it follows: 1) that no
physical injury or property damage caused by a motor vehicle acci-
dent, explosives, highly inflammable or toxic substances, fire, high-
voltage electricity, weapons, or dangerous machinery will be too re-
mote; 2) that no increased physical or emotional injury resulting from
an unusual or particular susceptibility of a person suffering damages
as a result of a negligent act will be too remote; and 3) no medical
complication resulting from an injury to a person is too remote. No
physical or emotional injury suffered by a rescuer will be too remote. 99
While any specific instance of any one of the above may not have
been reasonably foreseeable, they are all members of a class of the
kind of damages which often do occur.100 An examination of 334 re-
ported cases in Canada, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand
raising an issue of remoteness shows that approximately 92% of these
cases were decided consistently with the above underlying deep struc-
ture rule. 1 1 Thus, one of the areas of law most often considered to be
the least rule governed actually turns out to be highly structured when
examined from the perspective of the underlying teleology of that
area of the law. Remoteness issues reveal a conflict between the goals
of deterring negligent behavior and compensation for harm caused,
and freedom of action. Strict liability would inhibit action, and no
liability would encourage reckless conduct. Analysis of the underlying
teleological structures of the law (teleoanalytic jurisprudence) reveals
97. See id. at 138, 159-60.
98. See id. at 136-37, 160.
99. See id. at 160.
100. See id. at 132-33.
101. See id. at 138-40.
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a high degree of consistency in the way in which legal doctrine is asso-
ciated with the discourse of the material facts of life, which traditional
legal theories have failed to recognize.
2. The Nervous Shock Advisor
The Nervous Shock Advisor ("NSA"), developed at FLAIR, is
an expert system which will give advice as to whether nervous shock
caused by the negligence of another is recoverable in tort law, or is
precluded from recovery on the grounds that the shock to the nervous
system is too remote. 10 2 The system will advise, in other words, how
far down the chain of strict causality the law will go in compensating
victims of negligently induced nervous shock. Nervous shock is a term
coined by lawyers within the common law tradition. Its closest medi-
cal counterpart is posttraumatic stress disorder. Most U.S. jurisdic-
tions have a similar cause of action called "emotional distress." In
law, the classic case is the situation where the claimant is a bystander
who witnesses something terrible happening to someone else and suf-
fers shock as a result, such as where a mother sees her child killed by a
negligent driver. The NSA contained every case on this legal issue
from Canada, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.
In the common law systems of the British Commonwealth, the
plaintiff can recover for posttraumatic stress disorder if they are the
party injured or endangered. Where, however, the posttraumatic
stress disorder is suffered by someone other than the person at risk of
physical injury, the law of nervous shock will be found to be one of the
most difficult, obscure, and confusing areas of legal doctrine that one
could possibly find. In the first place, there is no general consensus in
the common law systems of the British Commonwealth as to whether
nervous shock is an issue of remoteness in the law of negligence or a
substantive tort in its own right. In spite of the doctrinal ambiguity
surrounding this area of the law, an examination of the cases reveal
that there are two necessary conditions for recovery for posttraumatic
stress disorder where the posttraumatic stress disorder is suffered by
someone other than the person at risk of physical injury. There must
be a certain degree of relationship between the parties, and a certain
degree of, exposure to the traumatic event. Relationship is a fuzzy
class which can be "defuzzified" by giving a precise numerical value to
102. See Cal Deedman & J.C. Smith, The Nervous Shock Advisor: A Legal Expert System in
Case-Based Law, in OPERATIONAL EXPERT SYSTEM APPLICATIONS IN CANADA 56 (Ching Y.
Suen & Rajjan Shiighal eds., 1991) [hereinafter Deedman, The Nervous Shock Advisor].
[Vol. 73:277
1998] MACHINE INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL REASONING 321
each different situation on a scale ranging from close to distant. In a
similar manner the degree of exposure can be broken up into a series
of specific situations where each member of the set can be given a
precise numerical value. The reasons for judgment in all of these
cases, however, are given in purely doctrinal form. Legal justification
is doctrinal and not factual.
Figure 7, a diagram of the knowledge structure of the Nervous
Shock Advisor, reflects an entirely factual structure, which is related
to the doctrinal structure through patterns of consistency in legal deci-
sions which reflect the underlying teleology of this area of the law.
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The following hypothetical set of facts can be used to demon-
strate how the system will respond to the answers of a set of factual
questions by rendering a legal judgment:
The plaintiff is the mother of a six year old child. As a result of the
defendant's negligence, the plaintiffs young daughter suffered exten-
sive burns about the face. The accident took place at school, and the
child was rushed immediately to the hospital. When the plaintiff ar-
rived there, she found her daughter resting under sedation, with her
face entirely covered with bandages. After several weeks of hospitali-
zation, the bandages were removed, and the plaintiff saw her daugh-
ter's badly scarred face for the first time, and as a result suffered
posttraumatic stress disorder or nervous shock. As a result of the
posttraumatic stress disorder the mother is unable to sleep at nights,
and consequently has had to give up a high paying job. The defend-
ant admits liability to the child, and the amount of damages has been
agreed upon by the parties through the negotiations of their lawyers,
but takes the position that there is insufficient proximity of exposure
to the accident to create a duty of care so far as the mother is
concerned.
The system will ask the user a series of factual questions to form a
profile of the problem in terms of the deep structure of the system,
whereupon it will give the following response:
I am pleased to inform you that your client has a cause of action for
nervous shock
The following is a breakdown of the various elements involved in this
decision. If any element has a certainty factor of less than 100%, you
should regard it as a weak link in the chain and focus on bolstering
your case in that area.
Plaintiff exposure to the incident: 60%.
Judgment: An action lies 60% percent.
The cases are returned in terms of three categories: on point, rele-
vant by analogy, and contra. The system returns the case of S. v. Dis-
tillers Co. (Biochemicals), Ltd.,103 where a mother recovered for
nervous shock sustained upon giving birth to an infant who suffered
severe deformities during embryonic development due to taking of
the drug thalidomide by the mother during her pregnancy. As well as
the closest contra case, the system makes available a list of cases
where there was insufficient exposure to the incident to justify recov-
ery. The system also reports a list of the leading cases and a list of
cases relating to the symptoms that the plaintiff might have suffered,
along with a summary of the facts and the express statements of the
judges relating to the symptoms.
103. 3 All E.R. 1412 (Q.B. 1969) (U.K.).
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3. The limits of expert systems
As a result of a decade of research and development at the UBC
FLAIR Project, we feel we can say with some confidence that the an-
swer to the question of whether machines can be made to think like
lawyers is a very qualified "Yes." Nevertheless, however, very few
true expert systems exist in the field of law. There are a number of
reasons why this is the case. Expert systems in law are extremely time
consuming, and therefore expensive to create and maintain. Lawyers
are reluctant to trust the decision of a machine, unless they fully un-
derstand the rule structure by which the decision was reached, and if
they did understand that, they would not need the expert system
query. Commercial programming shells, which facilitate the creation
of expert systems, have not proven to be reliable, in that they come
and go from the market. If they are not maintained by the software
company, the system cannot be maintained, but must be re-created in
a different shell, or written in a suitable programming language.
The purpose of creating expert systems in law at the FLAIR Pro-
ject was to learn more about the nature and structure of legal reason-
ing by attempting to simulate it in the machine. From this perspective,
we consider our research, whereby we have developed expert systems
through the representation of the teleologically deep structure which
underlies legal doctrinal rules in their application to factual situations,
to have been highly successful. We have found, as have many others,
that the simulation of legal reasoning in expert systems can be a highly
effective way to teach the nature and structure of legal reasoning.
Every year for the past six years in the legal theory course, Legal Rea-
soning and Artificial Intelligence, which we offer at the UBC Faculty
of Law, students have used the methodology in conjunction with the
commercial shell, VP Expert, to create small, but interesting and ef-
fective expert systems in restricted domains.
The expert systems developed at the FLAIR project represent
the relationship between legal doctrine and factual situations in terms
of the underlying patterns of consistency in the ordering of interests
and goals when they come into conflict. 1°4 Thus the underlying rule
104. See J.C. Smith & Cal Deedman, The Application of Expert System Technology to Case-
Based Law, in THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & LAW 84, 85 (1987); see also Deedman, The Nervous Shock Advisor, supra note
102; Andrzej Kowalski, Case-Based Reasoning and the Deep Structure Approach to Knowledge
Representation, in THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF ARTIFI-
CIAL INTELLIGENCE & LAW 21 (1991); Marilyn T. MacCrimmon, Expert Systems in Case-Based
Law: The Hearsay Rule Advisor, in THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & LAW 68 (1989); J.C. Smith, Action Theory and Legal
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structure of these expert systems represent the relationship between
legal doctrine and the material world of facts to which they are associ-
ated by judicial decisions, rather than representing the legal doctrine
itself. Following our "creative transformation" paradigm we take an
area of law where the cases appear to be decided inconsistently in
terms of the application of legal doctrine, and analyze them in terms
of the underlying conflicting interests and the likely effect which alter-
native orderings of those interests will have on the ordering of other
interests and goals reflected in the law. Where we can find patterns of
consistency of ordering in terms of the underlying teleology reflected
in the law (a teleological deep structure) we will then try and create
rules in terms of factual components which reflect these patterns of
consistency. Thus cases are reduced to goal orderings (the simplified
transformation). Factual questions are asked of the user in order for
the system to formulate a representation of the problem in terms of a
conflict of goals or interests. The system then seeks to find the closest
corresponding conflicts and orderings in its knowledge base, and
match it to that of the problem (the set of easier tasks). The system
then, on the bases of this match, suggests a solution to the issue that is
consistent with the teleological structures of the cases in its knowl-
edge-base (the inverse transformation) legal doctrine.
C. Putting the Judge into the Machine
Let us return to the question I used to initiate this examination of
the two alternative views of the nature of artificial or machine intelli-
gence, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges?, and see what would
be entailed in constructing a judicial machine that could actually adju-
dicate cases. This comparison will permit an evaluation of the
Church-Turing view of Al with that of Al as creative transformation.
1. The Cycic Judge
The most comprehensive artificial intelligence project thus far
which is based on the assumptions of the Church-Turing thesis is Cyc.
Cyc is a very large, multi-contextual knowledge base and inference
engine started in 1984 at the Microelectronics and Computer Technol-
ogy Corporation ("MCC") in Austin, Texas and transferred to Cycorp,
Reasoning, in TORT THEORY 104 (Ken Cooper & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993); Cal Deedman,
Developing Conceptual Systems for Structuring Legal Knowledge to Build Knowledge-Based
Systems (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of British Columbia) (on file with author).
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Inc. as a spin-off company from MCC.10 5 Consistent with the Church-
Turing thesis, Cyc is a massive knowledge base containing an enor-
mous amount of fundamental human knowledge in the form of facts,
rules, and heuristics for reasoning about the material facts of human
existence and everyday life. It now contains "more than 2 million bits
of assertions.
' 10 6
Assuming the Church-Turing thesis, a computer-based system
that could actually replace judges would have to be constructed on top
of Cyc with the addition of a full knowledge of case law and statutes
and regulations. We would thus have the Cycic Judge. This would be
one way to attempt to construct a computer that could resolve legal
issues. Typical of the statements of the critics of the Cyc Project is the
opinion that "[w]e believe this is a mistaken approach because it
wastes precious human resources and makes dubious theoretical
assumptions .... "107
2. A more modest proposal
Judges, lawyers, and academics can be conceived of as function-
ing within the context of a vast information system that reflects a com-
plex matrix of goals and their orderings. 10 8 Each case decided in favor
of a plaintiff or a defendant resolves a conflict of interest by hierarchi-
cally ordering the goals pitted against each other in the dispute. The
doctrine of precedent produces trends of consistency, with corrections
taking place where different circumstances result in conflicting sets of
ordering. Legal doctrines are constantly being restated, refined, and
modified. Legislation makes more prominent and massive corrections
to the goal structure, which in turn will filter their way through the
individual cases. When the practice of following precedent is applied,
and there are no express contradictions in the legal doctrine, legal de-
cisions will be consistent. If one understands the teleological structure
that is isomorphic for the doctrine and the decisions, one will be able
to maintain a fairly high degree of predictability as to how like cases
will be decided in the future, or the probable outcome of a dispute,
given a particular set of facts.
105. For online information on the Cyc Project, see Cycorp: Company Overview (visited Feb.
24, 1998) <http://www.cyc.com/overview.html>.
106. Garfinkel, supra note 1, at 187.
107. YORICK A. WILKS ET AL., ELECTRIC WORDS: DICIONARIES, COMPUTERS, AND MEAN-
INGS 7 (1996).
108. See COVAL & SMITH, supra note 60; see also Coval & Smith, supra note 88.
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One case is relevantly similar to another to the degree that it
shares the same teleological structure. A case shares the same teleo-
logical structure when the same goals or interests are at stake, with
similar causal relationships to other sets of like goals or interests. An
examination of the law will show that the decisions of the courts and
the effects of legislation result in a fairly consistent ordering of our
values. The prevention of physical harm, for example, is ranked
higher and more important than the prevention of economic loss. The
interest of employees to carry out effective collective bargaining gen-
erally takes priority over private property rights, if the negative im-
pact is minimal. From the fact that truth is a complete defense in the
law of defamation, we can infer that the dissemination of valid infor-
mation is more important than, and thus takes priority over, the pro-
tection of reputation.
We have found that we can represent the goal matrix of the law in
the form of a few basic deep structure rules for establishing priority.
In particular, an examination of the goal matrix of the law will show
that whenever one ordering of a pair of conflicting goals will maximize
only the first goal at the extreme expense of the second, while the
converse ordering will maximize the second goal and produce only a
minimal interference with the first, the law will generally prefer the
second ordering. If one particular ordering of goals as a result of a
legal decision will produce a loss of a more highly valued social goal,
while the opposite ordering will not, the law will tend to favor an or-
dering which will not have a negative impact on other goals within the
law.
An alternative to the methodology of the Cyc Project would be to
use the creative transformation methodology to represent the entire
body of case and statute law in terms of goals, their orderings, and
their cause-effect relationships on each other in terms of alternative
hierarchical priorities. The logic of the system would be based on a
set of deep structure teleological rules such as the following:
Rule One
If, when goal 1 is ordered over goal 2, the result will be a small
encroachment (-) on goal 2, and if, when goal 2 is ordered over goal 1,
the result will be a substantial encroachment (-) on goal 1, then goal 1
should be given priority over goal 2.




If, when goal 1 is ordered over goal 2, the degree of encroach-
ment on goal 2 is the same as the degree of encroachment on goal 1
when goal 2 is ordered over goal 1, and if goal 1 is consistently or-
dered over (is more important than) goal 2, then goal 1 should be
given priority over goal 2.
If.l---4 g' & - g' and if-- - g' & - g' and if g' > g2 then
g2  g g
Rule Three
If, when goal 1 is ordered over goal 2, the result will be a small
encroachment on goal 3, and if, when goal 2 is ordered over goal 1, the
result will be a substantial encroachment on goal 3, then goal 1 should
be given priority over goal 2.
If .--- g1 & - g3 and if gg -' g' & - g3 then
g2 1 2
Rule Four
If, when goal 1 is ordered over goal 2, the result will be a small
encroachment on goal 3, and if, when goal 2 is ordered over goal 1, the
result will be a substantial encroachment on goal 4, then goal 1 should
be given priority over goal 2.




If, when goal 1 is ordered over goal 2, the degree of encroach-
ment on goal 3 is the same as the degree of encroachment on goal 4
when goal 2 is ordered over goal 1, and if goal 3 is consistently or-
dered over (is more important than) goal 4, then goal 1 should be
given priority over goal 2.
If i-. g1 & - g3 and if -'- g2 & - g4 and if g3 > g4 then -
g2 9 1 g
Rule Six (transitivity)
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If goal 1 is consistently ordered over (more important than) goal
2 and goal 2 is consistently ordered over (more important than) goal 3,
then goal 1 should be given priority over goal 3.
If gt > g' and g
2 > g3 then g' > g3
All of the above rules would be subject to an overriding ceteris
paribus clause-all other things being equal. The competing goals
themselves may not be on an equal status. Certain goal values such as
those enshrined in a bill of rights take precedent over nearly all other
goals, particularly those not given constitutional priority. The com-
plexity of judicial reasoning is far beyond what is possible to represent
in the computer. Nevertheless, if one were to attempt the process, the
latter alternative would be easier to apply than the Cyc approach, and
probably more effective.
IX. MACHINE INTELLIGENCE AS CREATIVE TRANSFORMATION
Computer scientists who approached artificial intelligence from
the perspective of the Church-Turing paradigm generally assumed
that "coded knowledge of the real world was required if machines
were to understand language in any serious sense." 10 9 The vocabu-
laries of such systems, however, remain primitive and extremely lim-
ited. Significant developments in the field of natural language
processing generally have taken place where the researchers are work-
ing from alternative paradigms. Some of the most interesting and
promising areas of artificial intelligence and language have come from
research which combines psycholinguistics with computational linguis-
tics. Psycholinguistics is a branch of linguistics that examines language
in terms of how it functions in human thought and memory.
The idea or concept of the lexicon is the element where psychol-
inguistics and computational linguistics can be made to converge be-
cause the lexical component of language is common to both the
human and the computer. 110 Most of the lexical properties of lan-
guage can be represented in computer-based lexicons. As humans we
are used to using lexicons or dictionaries which are ordered alphabeti-
cally. Alphabetical organization is a widely used computer lexicon
109. MELZAK, supra note 9, at 1.
110. See, e.g., R. Beckwith et al., WordNet: A Lexical Database Organized on Psycholinguis-
tic Principles, in LEXICAL ACQUIsITION: EXPLOITING ONLINE RESOURCES TO BUILD A LEXICON




function. We are also familiar with ordering information hierarchi-
cally. Hierarchies are widely used in computational linguistic technol-
ogy to organize large databases of information. Computer scientists
use hierarchies to create inheritance systems whereby the subordinate
can be assumed to have inherited or to possess the properties of the
superordinate. Thus dogs, a subordinate category of mammals, can be
assumed to possess the defining properties of mammals. Synonyms
can be linked in computer-based lexicons. The use of lexicons permit
us to create lexical matrices in the computer. The contents of books,
documents, and databases can, through the process of creative trans-
formation, be simplified in the form of lexicons which then can be
processed to accomplish tasks which would be extremely difficult, or
not even possible to accomplish in their original natural language
form. The computer permits us to do a variety of creative transforma-
tions which can enable us to combine the best aspects of research in
the traditional print libraries with the advantages of electronic
databases, resulting in new forms of computer-based information
systems.








Obtaining information from a book by reading through the entire
book would be a difficult task. One need not read through an entire
book, however, in order to ascertain the nature of its content. Almost
all books contain a table of contents which represents the subject mat-
ter of the book. Legal knowledge is brought to the lawyer structured
from the general to the particular, from what is fundamental to what is
derivative. If the lawyer was dealing with the legal issue of the liabil-
ity of an occupier of land for a wrongful act such as an assault, com-
mitted by a third party on an invitee or licensee of the occupier, which
might have been prevented if the occupier had taken some specific
safety measure, the lawyer would organize her information need in
[Vol. 73:277
MACHINE INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL REASONING
the form of a hierarchical string such as that shown in Figure 8. The
lawyer would then attempt to find a corresponding match in the table
of contents of a legal text.
Doctrinal hierarchy is not the only form in which legal knowledge
is presented in the traditional library. Most books have an index as
well as a table of contents. Legal concepts and relevant terms will also
be found listed alphabetically. Without these two forms of content
representation, and the corresponding page numbers which returns
the reader from the representation to the actual content of the book
itself, the retrieval of information from a book would be much more
difficult. This form of organization is not only used in the alphabetical
index, but also in research tools such as the legal encyclopedias and
dictionaries. Books facilitate both top-down (from the general to the
specific) and bottom-up (from the specific to the general) methods of
legal research. Tables of contents and indexes are simplified transfor-
mations of the contents of the book which enable the reader to go
quickly to the portions of the book likely to contain the information
relevant to their information needs. The table of contents is a repre-
sentation of the hierarchical semantic structure of the content of the
book. An index is a representation of the content of the book in
terms of the important words presented in the form of an alphabetical
lexicon.
Another important way in which legal knowledge is presented to
the lawyer in the traditional library is in the form of abstraction. An
abstract gives a short summary of a legal document or case to help the
researcher know what the document is about and whether or not it is
likely to be relevant, and therefore whether more time is needed to
examine it further or to read it. Abstraction seeks to give the funda-
mental content in as short as possible form. Lawyers use many forms
of abstracts such as headnotes, summaries of the law, and various
forms of condensed versions of cases. Abstractions are also creative
transformations that make a difficult task easier to perform. Rather
than reading through a large number of cases in full text, the full texts
are represented by short abstracts which permit the lawyer to peruse
quickly, select those which appear to be relevant, and inversely trans-
form them by returning to the full text of the selected abstracts.
There are certain problems with traditional library sources of in-
formation that electronic databases do not face, the most important
being the element of time. There are thousands of cases in any single
jurisdiction, and the law of several jurisdictions may be highly relevant
to a problem. Seldom can any lawyer afford to spend the kind of time
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on a legal problem which would be required to discover all of the
relevant cases. The computer, on the other hand, can go through
thousands of documents in an electronic database in a matter of a few
seconds. Furthermore, a law library takes up a great deal of room. A
lawyer cannot put a library of books in her briefcase and take it home
at night. An entire library in electronic form, however, can be carried
in one's briefcase on a few CD-ROMs. Cases now are composed on
computers with word processing programs. In electronic form they
can be immediately made available on disks, through bulletin boards,
over the Internet, or through a modem connected to the telephone.
The cases exist in electronic form long before they appear in print.
Therefore, we rely on electronic data to obtain the most recent deci-
sions. The traditional library can never provide us with the most cur-
rent decisions. Furthermore, because the cases start in electronic
form, and carry no added value such as headnotes, legal information
in electronic form is much cheaper than when it is released in print. A
good deal of legal information, such as the most recent cases, can be
obtained free in many jurisdictions over the Internet.111
B. Difficult Tasks
We at the University of British Columbia FLAIR Project consid-
ered our research in the area of expert systems to be highly successful.
We nevertheless abandoned a fruitful direction of research to turn our
resources and efforts in an entirely different direction. We did so be-
cause we had become fully aware of the problematic nature of the
traditional Al paradigm which requires massive knowledge bases of
encoded information and/or strict formal logical inference patterns.
At the same time, we recognized that the success of our expert sys-
tems was based on a form of creative transformation whereby cases
were represented in a simplified transformation in terms of goals and
their ordering. When our research led us to adopt an alternative Al
paradigm in the form of creative transformations, we sought to under-
take a different approach whereby we could solve practical problems
through creative transformations rather than by simulating legal
reasoning.
111. See, e.g., Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute (last visited Feb. 24, 1998)
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/>; Chicago-Kent College of Law, Chicago-Kent Law Review Online
Research (last visited Feb. 24, 1998) <http://www.kentlaw.edu/lawrev/libraries.html>; Emory
University School of Law, Emory Law Library Federal Courts Finder (last visited Feb. 24, 1998)
<http://www.law.emory.edu/FEDCTS/>.
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While it is now possible to store enormous amounts of reported
decisions in electronic databases, the retrieval of relevant cases re-
mains an extremely difficult task. The area of information retrieval
presented us with the kind of challenge that would permit us to fur-
ther explore the potential of our alternative Al paradigm using lex-
icons as the form of simplified transformation. When we started this
change of direction back in 1989, lexicology was considered a backwa-
ter of natural language processing. Since then, it has become a major
field of research, thus justifying our earlier intuitions.112 With these
thoughts in mind, we set out to develop a new approach to document
retrieval in large domain-specific databases sich as those we find in
law. The method we chose was to represent the databases, and the
documents which constituted them, in terms of lexicons organized al-
phabetically, hierarchically, and in terms of frequency.
1. Making the invisible visible
Information in the form of books has significant advantages over
information in electronic form. The content of a book is observable
on its face through tables of contents, indexes, and summaries, and
one can skim the contents by quickly paging through and glancing at
each page. Moving through the information, however, takes a great
deal of time. Information retrieval in an electronic database is a much
more difficult task than the retrieval of information from books be-
cause the information in books is visible on the page, but the informa-
tion in an electronic database is not visible until it is actually retrieved.
Information must first be retrieved and then transformed into the vis-
ual symbols of the alphabet. The difficulty lies in that you cannot see
the information until you locate it, and you cannot locate it unless you
can see it. Books, nevertheless, can be put into an electronic form
with tables of contents and indexes, which can easily be brought to the
screen. If, however, one wanted merely to access a book, there is no
significant advantage to be had in transferring the content of the book
to an electronic database so far as information retrieval is concerned.
In fact, much is lost, in that skimming through the book by quickly
flipping the pages and looking for relevant concepts or significant
phrases is not possible in an electronic database. Merely putting
books into electronic databases does not take full advantage of the
112. See, e.g., WILKS ET AL., supra note 107; COMPUTATIONAL APPROACHES TO THE LEXI-
CON (B. T.S. Atkins & A. Zampolli eds., 1994); MACHINE TRACTABLE DICTIONARIES: DESIGN
AND CONSTRUCTION (Cheng-Ming Guo ed., 1995); COMPUTATIONAL LEXICOGRAPHY FOR NAT-
URAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING (Bran Boguraev & Ted Briscoe eds., 1989).
19981
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
lightning speed with which information can be processed in an elec-
tronic database.
The process of information retrieval, whether from a book or an
electronic database, follows the same pattern. The information needs
of the researcher must be simplified in the form of a transformation
which will represent the information need. This creative transforma-
tion, whether a member of a conceptual hierarchy or a list of words, is
then matched with the corresponding representation of the content of
the book or of the electronic database. When the relevant match is
found, the simplified representation is transformed back into the rele-
vant text.
Information retrieval becomes more efficient in databases rather
than books because of the huge amount of information which can be
inputted and stored in databases, and the speed with which that infor-
mation can be accessed, manipulated, and retrieved. Yet tables of
contents and indexes are manually created, and thus are expensive
and time-consuming to create. Simple tables of contents and indexes
such as those found in books have diminishing returns as the size of
databases increase. The difficult task in doing research in electronic
databases is to design an information system that will automatically
generate hierarchical conceptual structures, alphabetical indexes for
words and phrases, and sets of lists of significant factors out of the
content of each document, in a domain specific database. These
would permit the user to examine the content of the database and
locate the words and concepts that match the information needs. The
Flexicon technology consists of a set of libraries and tools which can
be used to create these lexicons in specific domains such as law or
medicine, or any other areas that lie within specific subject fields.
Thus the invisible is made visible.
2. Retrieval
Nearly all databases, whether online or CD-ROM, either come
with search engines attached, or are accessible through available
search engines. Search engines are generally one of two different
kinds: either exact-match or best-match. Exact match search engines
are generally Boolean. A Boolean search is an exact-match engine in
that a Boolean search engine will only return documents that exactly
match the query, and the documents will be returned in no particular
order. A Boolean search engine requires that the terms of the query
be joined with Boolean logical operators; i.e., with any one or more of
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AND, OR, or NOT. If AND is used, then the engine will retrieve
only documents which contain every term so joined. Such queries
generally return too little. If OR is used, then the search engine will
return any and every document which contains any one or more of the
so joined terms. Such queries generally return too much. If the
Boolean operator NOT is used before a term, then the search engine
will not return any document with that word in it, even if there are
other matching terms of the query. Most such search engines permit
proximity searches which enable an experienced researcher to form
more complicated queries by stipulating that certain terms must be
within a certain distance of each other.
In best-match search engines, the documents do not have to ex-
actly match the query, but are returned in a ranked order according to
their similarity with the query. A best-match search engine that per-
mits one to form the query in the way one normally writes or speaks,
is often referred to as a natural language search engine because it per-
mits the use of natural language queries.
FIGURE 9
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One of the most difficult problems in information retrieval is the
problem of knowing whether or not one has retrieved all of the rele-
vant documents which are to be found in the database. The more
common method of retrieval of information from an electronic
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database is through the use of a Boolean search engine. One of the
few studies made regarding this problem was the Blair & Maron study
carried out on a large database of legal documents using a Boolean
exact match search engine.113 As can be seen in Figure 9, the Blair &
Maron report concluded at the end of an extensive series of tests car-
red out by experienced lawyers on a legal database, that while the
lawyers thought that they had retrieved approximately 75% of the rel-
evant documents in the database, they in fact had only recovered ap-
proximately 20% .114
Most experienced legal researchers use a combination of both
Boolean and best-match search engines because each have certain ad-
vantages and disadvantages, depending upon the nature of the infor-
mation requirements. A Boolean search engine permits the use of
multiple word groupings in the search query, but does not return the
documents ranked as to how well they match the information need
which the query represents. For example, if a search returns sixty doc-
uments, the most relevant case may be the very last. The lawyer must
examine each of the sixty cases retrieved to discover which are rele-
vant to the legal problem, and thus conform to the information need.
Non-Boolean best-match search engines, on the other hand, return
the documents with some semblance of relevance ranking but they do
not permit the use of multiple word groupings and phrases in the
search query. One is limited to using single words. This is a very seri-
ous limitation because a large number of legal concepts and query
items consist of several words.
Because both the capacity to use multiple word combinations in
the search query and the capacity to return cases ranked in terms of
relevancy are essential features for efficient research in an electronic
database, it would seem to make sense to combine the two kinds of
search engines into one. This, however, is not possible because of the
unique and fundamentally different nature of their structures. Legal
publishers have added on to the two kinds of search engines, so far as
their structures will permit, some limited functions of the other kind
of engines. The commercial legal Boolean search engines offer some
limited ranking in terms of an algorithm that statistically measures the
frequency of the terms of the query as compared to the frequency of
their occurrences in the database as a whole, and ranks the cases ac-
113. See David C. Blair & M. E. Maron, An Evaluation of Retrieval Effectiveness for a Full
Text Document Retrieval System, 28 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 289 (1985).
114. See id. at 293.
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cordingly. Best-match search engines can be given a limited multiple
word facility by attaching a built-in lexicon of frequently used word
groupings which permits the system to recognize and treat a phrase as
if it were a single word. If a multiple word item is not in the attached
lexicon, however, each word will be considered a separate item.
The Flexicon system is a lexically designed and structured search
engine for domain specific vertical information markets such as law
and medicine which combines both relevance ranking and multiple
term queries, permitting a precision of recall far exceeding any ex-
isting search engine on the market. The Flexicon information system
permits the user to form a much more detailed representation of the
information need than is possible using Boolean or exact-match 
que-
ries, by the use of the lexicons which reveal the content of the
database. Thus, a profile of the kind of document that will fit the
information need can be formulated which will be used to retrieve the
best matches in the documents comprising the database. While a
query normally will only contain anywhere from a few to a dozen or
two dozen terms, a profile of an information need, or a document pro-
fie can contain a hundred or so terms, if appropriate. Each term in a
Flexicon search proffle can be given a weight of high, medium, low, or
negative weight, and each of the different lexicons can be given differ-
ent weights. This permits a high degree of precision in document re-
trieval, and one can, depending upon how far one has time to go down
the list of returned documents, obtain a far higher percentage of rele-
vant documents than is possible using the traditional forms of search
queries.
3. Automatic abstraction
The database in a Flexicon information system exists electroni-
cally in three forms. The first is the lineal text of each original docu-
ment, the second is the entire database in the form of the lexicons, and
the third is each document in the database individually in the form of
the lexicons. Each document is retrieved in the form of a FlexNote
which provides a proffle of the case in terms of legal doctrinal con-
cepts, facts, cited cases, and cited statutes which are presented to the
user in the form of four lexicons which are each ordered according to
the importance of the listed items. The ranking is based on term fre-
quency, including the synonyms of legal concepts and the alternative
forms of case and statute citations, normalized over the database.
One can then glance at the profile of the document on the screen and
quickly decide if the document is likely to be relevant. The FlexNote,
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therefore, constitutes a machine-created abstract of the document.
One can then hypertext from each item in the document proffle to
each of its occurrences in the document or go directly to the full text.
The objective of the Flexicon technology is to have the machine,
as far as possible, process the raw data, and create added value such as
FlexNote abstracts, automatic subject classification, machine recogni-
tion, and header or title formation. The aim of our research is not to
seek to replace judges and lawyers, but to, as much as possible, re-
place by the machine the experts who give the raw data added value.
C. Making Research Easy
The Flexicon system takes an entire database of cases in elec-
tronic form and separates the text into five groups. It first eliminates
the noise words such as the, and, or, in, at, etc., but it does not elimi-
nate them altogether. Through parsing functions, it retains them
where they function as a part of a phrase. The system attempts as
much as possible to recognize and retain whole phrases. The remain-
ing text is divided into legal concepts (including single terms and
phrases), factual terms and phrases, the names of cases, and statutory
references. The concepts are organized both hierarchically as well as
alphabetically, and statute citations and references are organized in
the familiar way, alphabetically by statute within each jurisdiction,
with the section references in the numerical ordering of the sections
and subsections. The factual and case lexicons are in alphabetical or-
der. The quadrant of concepts, cases, facts, and statutes is the organi-
zational structure of the legal knowledge as represented in the
machine.
Legal concepts and their synonyms are recognized and extracted
by a master-hierarchically ordered-legal-doctrinal-concept lexicon.
Each concept in the master-concept lexicon is classified by extraction
rules as stemmable, moveable, and separable. Stemmable means that
suffixes can vary. Separable means that words can come in between
the primary words of the concept phrase, and moveable means that
the words can appear in a different order. Thus "attorney's negli-
gence" is separable, stemmable, and moveable because "attorney's
negligence" matches "attorney was negligent" and "negligence of the
attorney." Cases and statutes are recognized by an extraction strategy
using the form of citation plus fuzzy matching (recognizes errors in
spelling or citations) and a cited cases grammar which extracts full
case names and citations, case names without citations, citations with-
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out case names, abbreviated case names, and abbreviated citations, all
of which are matched to the full case name and citation. The system
selects an ideal form for the citation based upon the case, and then
upon the database as a whole. Statutes are recognized by the citation
form, the statute grammar, and fuzzy matching. The statute grammar
recognizes and extracts the full statute citation, isolates sections, and
matches them to the appropriate statute. The current Bluebook fur-
nishes the ideal form. The fact lexicon is a default lexicon with the
noise words removed except where they form a part of a fact phrase.
The extraction strategy uses a grammar to join adjacent fact words
and modifiers to form fact phrases, and facts and fact phrases are
equated using stemming.
Not only is the entire text of the database organized into these
sets of lexicons, each individual case is also represented in terms of
quadrants of concepts, cases, facts, and legislation. The organization
within each case, however, is different than in the database as a whole
where the lexicons are hierarchical, alphabetical, or both. In the indi-
vidual case, the four sets are organized in terms of frequency. The
four types of proffle terms are weighted and sorted by factors reflect-
ing their distribution in the processed document and the data collec-
tion. Hypertext links are automatically placed which permits the user
to hypertext from the terms in the quadrant to each reference in the
case. The quadrant thus functions as a FlexNote abstract of the case
providing the user with a compact and structured representation of
the text, excluding only noise words. From the concepts felony mur-
der and robbery, the factual terms clerk, heart attack, and death, the
statute reference, Section 189 of the California Penal Code, which sets
out the crime of felony murder, and the case, People v. Dillon, the
leading California decision on this offense, one can immediately de-
duce that the case is about a charge of murder brought against an
accused who is alleged to have caused the death of a store clerk who
died of a heart attack during the course of a robbery.
The following is an example of a typical legal problem drawn
from the law of torts.
The plaintiff, a university student enrolled in an evening class, had to
walk down an unlit path bordered by shrubs and bushes in order to
reach the parking lot where her car was parked. When proceeding to
her car, after her class, an assailant dragged her into the bushes and
sexually assaulted her.
This statement of the problem is also a version of an information
need. A good Boolean representation of it would be:
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university college /p student and ((sexual! /2 assault) or rape! and
(foliage or shrub! or bush! or tree) and security and negligen!
A best-match natural language query would look something like
the following:
Does an occupier owe a "duty of care" to an invitee or licensee to
provide security or other safeguards on the occupier's premises
against assault by a "third party" or otherwise provide a safe
environment?
A best-match search engine allowing the use of a natural lan-
guage query eliminates the noise words, thus creating a simple list in
which multiple word items contained in its attached concept lexicon
are grouped together as single items.
The Flexicon system consists of two basic kinds of lexicons: static
and dynamic. The static lexicons are fixed, while the dynamic lexicons
are created during the information retrieval process. The major func-
tion of the dynamic lexicons is to reveal the content of the database in
a lexical form centering around a particular word or concept. The
user enters the word or concept, and the system then creates a lexicon
of terms and phrases which include that word or one of its forms,
either at the beginning, at the end, or inside the phrase, and returns
the lexicon alphabetically ordered.
A Flexicon information-need profile is constructed by selecting
items from the lexicons. In most cases, a user would generally start
with the law. The concept-hierarchical lexicon will permit the user to
select the appropriate areas of the law and highlight in the corre-
sponding dialogue box the items that the user wishes to use to form
the profile of the information need. The system will also provide the
user with a dynamically created lexicon of all forms of that term, or
phrases in which it is to be found, and present them to the user in
alphabetical order. Appropriate items would then be highlighted in
the list for inclusion in the information-need profile. Behind the
scenes, Flexicon automatically includes all of the synonyms of that
concept. The default weighting of medium can then be altered for any
term where it is appropriate.
The next step would be to consider the factual script to which the
legal doctrine will be applied. The user can build up a profile of the
factual elements of the script by entering a core factual term in a dia-
logue box. The system will immediately create a dynamic lexicon of
all of the forms and phrases that appear in the database containing a
form of that word, or a phrase in which a form of it occurs. The plain-
tiff, in the above set of facts, will be a student, so one can enter the
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word "student," and the system will return an alphabetically ordered
lexicon of multiple word items from which one might select "attacks
by non-students," "college students," "female student," and "protect
students." Similar dynamic lexicons can be created around key con-
cepts such as "security" and "campus."
The capacity of the system to create dynamic lexicons around
specific terms permits one to enrich the profile of the information
need to cover cases which raise the same legal issues but in a different
factual context. The lawyer generally creates a script out of the set of
facts or story which gives rise to the legal issues in order to locate
cases that may be somewhat factually different, but raise relevantly
similar legal issues. The profile can be broadened to cover similar sit-
uations, such as other kinds of educational institutions, other kinds of
wrongful acts, and other kinds of failures to remove different kinds of
risks. Thus, a lookup on the term "parking" will produce a dynamic
lexicon from which one can select items such as "restaurant parking
lot," "parking garage," "shopping mall parking area," etc.-all places
where a criminal assault or a robbery might take place. Thus the user
can form a profile of not only the particular set of facts, but also a
range of factual situations giving rise to the same legal issues.
The user now would be ready to perform the initial search. The
Flexicon system would then retrieve a large number of cases, ranked
in terms of relevancy in regard to the problem profile. If one went
through these cases in order of relevance, by looking at their
FlexNotes, viewing the text and paging down to the facts, one would
find that almost all are relevant to our legal problem. In the case
quadrant of each FlexNote, the user will see the names of a number of
cases, appearing more or less frequently. If one hypertexts down on
each occurrence of these cases, one would soon discover that they are
considered by the judges as leading authorities for these kinds of
problems. As the user locates these cases and highlights them in the
FlexNote of a case, the user can add them to the problem profile.
About eleven or so cases will be found more frequently cited in the
list of returned relevant cases, and so now ought to be added to the
problem profile in the case quadrant as leading and frequently cited
cases. A similar examination of the statute references would be car-
ried out next to locate any statutory provision cited in a number of the
relevant cases. If one knows the name of one party to a case and
wishes to look at the case or add it to the problem or information-
need profile, the user would enter the name in the dialogue box and
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perform a Lookup that creates a dynamic, alphabetically ordered lexi-
con of the cases having that name somewhere within the citation.
Relevance ranking can be significantly improved by weighing in-
dividual items (the default position being medium) as high or low, or
by reducing relevance. Key legal concepts unique to the particular
legal issue can be marked as high, while concepts that appear fre-
quently in several areas of the law can be marked as low or given a
reduction of weight function. The present Flexicon system gives each
quadrant a particular weight. These weights were formulated after ex-














The Flexicon system is still in the development stage. The largest
database upon which it has been tested is approximately thirty three
thousand cases consisting of the California Third and Fourth Series.
Retrieval effectiveness or retrieval performance is measured in terms
of a comparison between how many of the relevant documents are
returned (recall) and the proportion of relevant documents to non-
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relevant documents (precision) at any point of recall.115 Performance
is often portrayed by the use of a graph (see Figure 10, for example)
with the vertical axis showing precision and the horizontal axis show-
ing recall. A system that returns more relevant documents than an-
other system and returns a higher number of documents near the top
of a ranking is considered to perform better than one that retrieves a
smaller number of cases, with less of the relevant documents at the
top of the ranking. A perfect performance would be to return all of
the relevant documents first, then the semi-relevant documents, where
there is a minor modification from the factual script, then the first
non-relevant document. The straighter the line, the more efficient is
the system. The graph in Figure 10 compares the performance of two
Flexicon searches on the above problem with that of two leading best-
match search engines using the above natural language query on the
same set of California cases. The first Flexicon search was performed
with all terms of the problem profile at the default weight of medium,
while the second was performed with some terms uniquely specific to
this kind of legal issue such as non-feasance weighted high, and some
terms likely to occur in several different doctrinal areas such as rape
and assault weighted low. All of the initial non-relevant cases that
were returned dealt with an invitee or licensee who had suffered harm
caused by a third party while on the premises of the defendant occu-
pier, except the wrongful act of the third party was negligent rather
than intentional. The term negligence in the second Flexicon problem
proffile was given a negative weight in order to reduce the relevancy
ranking of these semi-relevant cases. In addition, the weight of the
case quadrant as a whole had been doubled as further testing had
proven that case citations give better results than any of the other
three quadrants. The precision for the first eighteen documents re-
turned by the unweighted Flexicon profile search is 100%, and then it
dips slightly with the first non-relevant case, gradually drops slightly
more up to the fortieth case, but then drops substantially. This drop
indicates that a substantial number of non-relevant cases are now be-
ing returned. The precision for the first forty five cases returned by
the weighted Flexicon profile was 100%. Weighting, therefore nearly
tripled the degree of perfect relevance ranking. Both best-match
searches did substantially better than the Boolean search, and per-
formed very close to each other so far as the results were concerned.
115. See Howard Turtle, Text Retrieval in the Legal World, 3 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
LAW 5, 10-16 (1995).
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In all cases, the test of relevancy was the same; conformity with the
factual script. Semi-relevant cases were treated as non-relevant. Only
cases that involved the failure of an occupier of land or premises to
prevent a wrongful act of a third party to an invitee or a licensee on
the property itself were considered to be relevant.
There is another element that must be taken into account, partic-
ularly where recall is concerned. The lower the precision in terms of
increasing numbers of non-relevant decisions, the greater the amount
of time it takes to ascertain which of the returned cases are relevant
and to estimate what percentage of the relevant documents have been
retrieved. Theoretically one can, in fact, recover all of the relevant
decisions in a database of cases if one is willing to spend that amount
of time. Almost all systems, however, cut off the number of cases re-
turned where relevance ranking becomes so bad that it is a waste of
time to go further down a list of returned cases. A comparison of the
results of the best-match, the Boolean exact-match, and the Flexicon
system illustrates the capacity of a lexically based search engine for
combining relevance ranking with the capacity to use multiple word
items in forming the search query. All of the cases returned by the
well-formed Boolean query were relevant, but the query found only
four out of the approximately sixty relevant cases to be found in the
database. If the Boolean query was broadened to return a larger
number of relevant cases, it would return a substantial number of non-
relevant cases at the same time. The best-match searches, while they
retrieved approximately half of the relevant cases, returned them with
a substantial number of non-relevant cases intermingled with the rele-
vant ones. The unweighted Flexicon search returned forty five rele-
vant cases up to its point of cut-off. The weighted Flexicon search
returned sixty cases up to its point of cut-off and alternative forms of
research found no other relevant cases.
The Flexicon system is reiterative in that it facilitates relevance
feedback by permitting the lawyer to continue to improve the match
between the search proffle of the problem and the information need.
Rather than simulating what lawyers do, the Flexicon system becomes
a partner with the lawyer. The Flexicon system, therefore, is an exam-
ple of the kind of Al development possible using the creative transfor-
mation model of artificial intelligence as contrasted with the more
traditional paradigm that would take research in the direction of the
Cyc Project and the quest for the "artificial judge."
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CONCLUSION
The Church-Turing thesis is based on premises which are no
longer persuasive, at least for the foreseeable future. Our understand-
ing of language and cognitive science has left it behind. At the same
time, technology itself has gone in a different direction. The decline in
the use of mainframe computers and the proliferation of the desktop
computer and workstations; the development of the Internet; commu-
nication technology whereby the computer and the television are con-
verging; and the use of optical cable, all are pointing in the direction
of huge information networks or matrices, rather than standalone in-
telligent machines. Thus, the computer can be more usefully viewed
as an extension of the human rather than as a simulation of the
human. This massive information network will bring enormous
changes to the human race, but they will be very different from those
projected by the false prophets of the Church-Turing thesis. A more
useful metaphor might be to view this as a materialization of a collec-
tive unconscious which will shape the consciousness of those who are
able to tap into it.
There is only one kind of intelligence, and that is human. As
stated by one Al theorist, "[i]ntelligence, as we know it, is (so far) a
biological phenomenon, rather than a logical or mathematical phe-
nomenon." 116 If we continue the metaphor of artificial intelligence,
we will continue to misconstrue both the nature of ourselves and this
marvelous technology which humankind has produced. Computers
are the most recent and outmost layer of a set of symbolic representa-
tional systems. We are born into language and within it we formulate
the human perceptual-conceptual system that constitutes our world.
Rather than viewing the computer and the human as two different
intelligent systems struggling to communicate with each other, a more
useful way to view the relationship between the human and the
machine is to view the machine as an extension of the human informa-
tion system.
Some time ago, many of us saw on the television news a female
gorilla tenderly pick up an unconscious three year old who had fallen
into the pit that confined the gorilla, and gently place the child by the
door where the zoo keeper could retrieve him.117 It occurred to me
then, that if we wish to find intelligence analogous to that of the
116. Chandrasekaran, supra note 69, at 44.
117. See Gorilla at an Illinois Zoo Rescues a 3-Year Old Boy, N.Y. Times, August 17, 1996, at
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human, we should look to our fellow species with whom we share over
98% of our genetic code and ponder the wonder and complexity of
life, rather than to computers which, after all, are our own creations.
In an ancient myth, immortalized in one of the greatest dramas ever
written, 118 the Sphinx posed a riddle to Oedipus. What goes on four in
the morning, two at noon, and three at night? The question, What is
intelligence?, is just another form of that riddle. Oedipus, according to
the story, thought that he had solved the riddle with his answer,
"Man!" I but he had not. The Sphinx, herself, represented the answer
to the riddle I life-producing female, animal, and something beyond
the animal, which we call intelligence. Oedipus's failure to recognize
the essence of being led to his tragedy. The answer to the riddle of the
Sphinx will be found in our animality, and not in our technology. The
idea of intelligent and thinking machines that can perform the range
of tasks of which the human is capable is, in itself, a form of Oedipal
blindness, and a reflection of our own denial of our animality.
The question posed by Professor D'Amato, Can/Should Com-
puters Replace Judges?, is not the right question to be asking as it im-
plicitly assumes the yet unproved Church-Turing Thesis. At this point,
we have absolutely no idea whether or not at some distant future time
it will be possible to replicate a perceptual-conceptual system in terms
of non-organic materials. As stated by one computer scientist:
Al is based on a mistaken theoretical assumption: the idea that
we know what kind of computing thinking is, which in turn mistak-
enly draws support from the theory of computation.... [T]he mat-
ter can only be settled by waiting to see what happens. But given
Al's confusion about what computer programs are for, its confusion
about its theoretical foundations, and its dogmatic refusal to take its
failures seriously, it is time that we at least considered the possibility
that current Al is incapable of sustaining an inquiry into the nature
of intelligence and intelligent thought. 119
I personally believe that the human race will never celebrate the
birthday of HAL or any kind of artificial intelligence system with the
capabilities imagined by Clarke and Kubrick in 2001: A Space Odys-
sey, 120 because top-down creative and inventive human planning can
never begin to match the creative potential of the lengthy complex
118. See Sophocles, Oedipus the King, in THE THREE THEBAN PLAYS 155 (Robert Eagles
trans., 1982).
119. Eric Dietrich, Programs in the Search for Intelligent Machines: The Mistaken Founda-
tions of AI, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 223, 229 (Derek Partridge &
Yorick Wilks eds., 1990).
120. See HAL'S LEGACY: 2001's COMPUTER AS DREAM AND REALITY (D. G. Stork ed.,
1997).
[Vol. 73:277
MACHINE INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL REASONING.
adaptive evolutionary processes121 which have produced we sentient
homo sapiens, one of the five species of ape.122 Time, however, will
tell.
For the time being, at least, our time and our resources can be
more profitably spent by seeking methods of solving DIFFICULT
TASKS related to legal information through the process of CREA-
TIVE TRANSFORMATIONS, permitting the computer to carry out
a complicated series of SIMPLE TASKS, which can then be IN-
VERSELY returned in a form wherein the DIFFICULT TASK has
been completed. If we consciously pursue the CREATIVE TRANS-
FORMATION methodology, rather than seeking to replicate or simu-
late human intelligence in the machine, I think that we will find that
we will continue to produce results which will continue to stagger the
imagination.
121. See, e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER: WHY THE EVIDENCE OF
EVOLUTION REVEALS A UNIVERSE WrrHoUT DESIGN (1987); JOHN HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER
(1995); MURRAY GELL-MANN, THE QUARK AND THE JAGUAR: ADVENTURES IN THE SIMPLE
AND THE COMPLEX (1994); M. MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT
THE EDGE OF ORDER AND CHAOS (1992).
122. It is now recognized that there are five rather than four species of apes. In addition to
the orangutan, gorilla, human, and chimpanzee, there is the bonobo, once thought to be a spe-
cies of chimpanzee until genetic tests proved conclusively that it is a separate species, closer to
the human in terms of the similarity of the genetic code than even the chimpanzee, which is
closer to the human than it is to the gorilla. See RICHARD WRANGHAM & DALE PETERSON, THE
DEMONIC MALES: APES AND THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN VIOLENCE 203-219 (1996).
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